The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A China-Centric Vision for Eurasia
Summary by Komal Pooja, C3S
Introduction
Earlier this month, leaders of Eurasian nations gathered at the Independence Palace in Astana, Kazakhstan, for the 24th annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). In attendance were the heads of state and government of Kazakhstan, China, India, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Belarus, Mongolia, Azerbaijan, Qatar, the UAE, Turkey, and Turkmenistan. The SCO represents more than 3 billion people, covering over 60 percent of Eurasia.
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has emerged as a pivotal geopolitical bloc, reshaping the Eurasian landscape. Initially conceived as a security-focused platform, the SCO has evolved into a multifaceted organization encompassing political, economic, and cultural cooperation. This article delves into the organization's transformation, particularly emphasizing China's ascendant role and the SCO's strategic importance for Beijing. The SCO's trajectory underscores its departure from a purely regional security arrangement to a more comprehensive platform for addressing shared challenges and opportunities. As China's global influence has grown, so has its prominence within the SCO, positioning the organization as a cornerstone of Beijing's foreign policy strategy. (Li)
Evolving Vision of the SCO
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) aims to ensure security, maintain stability, and promote trade, cultural, and humanitarian cooperation across the Eurasian region. It seeks to build a just, polycentric world order that respects international law and principles of mutual respect. The organization prioritizes openness, non-aggression, and peaceful dispute resolution. The historic summit in Astana in June 2017 had marked a significant expansion with the inclusion of India and Pakistan, enhancing the SCO's capabilities in combating security threats and promoting stability across a vast region that includes nearly 44% of the world's population.
The SCO emphasizes international law and diplomacy in conflict resolution, supporting the United Nations' role in global security. It coordinates efforts to combat terrorism, extremism, and transnational crime through its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which has successfully prevented numerous terrorist activities. The organization also addresses the threat of illicit drug trafficking, achieving significant successes in drug seizures and collaborating with international bodies like the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
Economic development is crucial in preventing new security threats, focusing on regional cooperation, trade facilitation, and infrastructure development. The organization also prioritizes cultural dialogue to enhance mutual understanding, reduce intolerance, and promote peace. The SCO's evolving vision includes expanding its membership, strengthening security measures, fostering economic growth, and promoting cultural exchanges to build a stable and prosperous region (Alimov)
SCO as an Alternative to Western Organisations
The broader effectiveness of the SCO is a subject of intense debate among Eurasian watchers. While some question its efficacy, there is consensus on the positive contributions of its Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which facilitates information sharing and coordinates military exercises. Despite internal challenges, such as Russia's ongoing security issues and differences in member states' geopolitical views, the SCO remains a significant institution in Eurasia. Its inclusivity, contrasting with Western security alliances, allows it to address diverse geopolitical challenges (Aslam and Ahmad)
For countries like India, the SCO represents a development-oriented organization rather than an anti-West alliance. It provides a platform to manage bilateral conflicts and pursue regional development, aligning with broader regional stability and prosperity goals. The SCO's inclusive approach enables it to function as a cooperative forum for countries with varying strategic interests (Freeman)
China’s Ascendance within SCO and Its Importance
China's role within the SCO is central to its strategy of challenging the U.S.-led international order and promoting its vision of global governance. Despite internal disagreements within the SCO, particularly due to India's tense relations with China and Pakistan, Beijing continues to leverage the organization to further its geopolitical objectives. China views the SCO as a crucial platform to enhance Eurasian connectivity through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and amplify its influence on the global stage.
Under China's rotating chairmanship, President Xi Jinping has outlined an ambitious agenda, including promoting financial transactions in local currencies to reduce reliance on the U.S. dollar and establishing a financing platform within the SCO. Xi also emphasized developing a "universal center" for security with branches focusing on intelligence sharing and counter-narcotics cooperation.
China's active engagement in the SCO, particularly through initiatives aimed at integrating the group's economies and enhancing security cooperation, illustrates its commitment to shaping an international order aligned with Chinese principles. This strategy includes increasing involvement in Afghanistan to ensure regional stability and protect Chinese investments. The SCO also serves as a tool for China to maintain regional security by limiting external influences, particularly from Western states or organizations. The SCO's influence in this area was demonstrated when China successfully pressured for a timetable to withdraw U.S.-led forces from Afghanistan in 2005.
The SCO is also pivotal for China's economic strategies, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The organization supports infrastructure development, trade facilitation, and regional connectivity, aligning with China's broader economic ambitions. China's significant financial contributions and preferential loans to SCO members further cement its leadership role. The SCO's support for BRI and other economic initiatives demonstrates its effectiveness as a platform for China's regional and global aspirations (Battams)
SCO’s Importance to China
The SCO is a crucial component of China's foreign policy strategy. It serves as a platform for China to promote its vision of regional security and economic cooperation, aligning with its broader goal of reshaping global governance structures. China can counterbalance U.S. influence in Asia through the SCO and strengthen ties with key regional players like Russia and India. Moreover, the SCO provides a forum for China to address security concerns, particularly in Xinjiang, where Beijing fears the spread of extremism. The organization's focus on counter-terrorism and security cooperation directly supports China's domestic stability and regional security objectives.
Expansion and the Future
The SCO's expansion to include new members and observer states, such as Belarus and Iran, highlights its growing relevance and appeal. This expansion reflects the organization's broadening scope and the increasing importance of Eurasia in global geopolitics. However, managing the diverse interests of a larger membership poses challenges for the SCO. Balancing the priorities of new and existing members while maintaining focus on core issues like security, economic cooperation, and cultural exchange will be crucial for the organization's future success
As the SCO continues to evolve, its role as a counterbalance to Western-led institutions becomes more pronounced. The organization's ability to adapt to changing geopolitical dynamics and member states' needs will determine its future trajectory. Under China's chairmanship, the upcoming year may see a more assertive agenda, integrating Beijing's "Global Security Initiative" and further consolidating a multipolar world order (Sciorati and Walsh)
Conclusion
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has emerged as a significant force in Eurasian geopolitics, reflecting the region's shifting power dynamics and the rise of China as a central player. As the SCO continues to evolve, it offers an alternative vision to Western-dominated international organizations, emphasizing sovereignty, equality, and regional cooperation. China's SCO leadership is pivotal in shaping the organization's direction and priorities. The SCO's future, marked by potential expansion and increased influence, will play a crucial role in shaping the geopolitical landscape of Eurasia and beyond.
References
Alimov, Rashid. “The Role of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in Counteracting Threats to Peace and Security | United Nations.” the United Nations, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/role-shanghai-cooperation-organization-counteracting-threats-peace-and-security. Accessed 30 July 2024.
Aslam, Sabah, and Nafees Ahmad. “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: A Rising Counterweight to Western Influence.” Modern Diplomacy, 7 July 2024, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/07/07/the-shanghai-cooperation-organisation-a-rising-counterweight-to-western-influence/. Accessed 30 July 2024.
Battams, George. “How Effective Is the SCO as a Tool for Chinese Foreign Policy?” E-International Relations, 26 February 2019, https://www.e-ir.info/2019/02/26/how-effective-is-the-sco-as-a-tool-for-chinese-foreign-policy/. Accessed 30 July 2024.
Freeman, Carla. “China, Russia See SCO at Counterweight to NATO but India Is Ambivalent.” United States Institute of Peace, 11 July 2024, https://www.usip.org/publications/2024/07/china-russia-see-sco-counterweight-nato-india-ambivalent. Accessed 30 July 2024.
Li, Nigel. “How Kazakhstan's SCO Chairmanship Has Navigated East-West Tensions.” The Diplomat, 11 July 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/how-kazakhstans-sco-chairmanship-has-navigated-east-west-tensions/. Accessed 30 July 2024.
Sciorati, Giulia, and Matthew Walsh. “SCOring Higher? China, Russia, and the Future of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.” The China-Global South Project, 4 July 2024, https://chinaglobalsouth.com/analysis/scoring-higher-china-russia-and-the-future-of-the-shanghai-cooperation-organization/. Accessed 30 July 2024.
“Why has Belarus joined the SCO? What does it mean for the bloc?” Firstpost, 4 July 2024, https://www.firstpost.com/explainers/why-has-belarus-joined-the-sco-what-does-it-mean-for-the-bloc-13789169.html. Accessed 30 July 2024.
C3S Exclusive
Third Plenary Session - Summary
By Sapna Elsa Abraham, Senior Research officer, C3S
On July 18, 2024, China concluded its four-day Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP). These plenary sessions, which are the highest form of consultation by the CPPCC, are called and presided over by the Standing Committee of the CPPCC National Committee. Typically held annually in March alongside the NPC's annual session, these meetings gather Central Committee members to outline China's long-term economic and social policies. Historically, the Third Plenary Session is significant for discussing crucial economic-policy initiatives. For example, the 11th Central Committee meeting in 1978 marked the start of Deng Xiaoping’s "Reform and Opening Up" policy. This year's session was highly anticipated by China watchers to see what reforms would address the country's struggling economy.
The delayed Plenary session outlined two primary decisions: 1. "further deepening reform comprehensively" and 2. "advancing Chinese modernization." They set a goal to complete these reform tasks by 2029. A communique was issued after the closed-door session, which, contrary to the expectations of many experts and observers, did not introduce many new fiscal policies or packages. Instead, it reaffirmed the CCP’s long-term vision of deepening reform and pursuing Chinese-style modernization, emphasizing innovation, green energy, and consumption as key growth drivers.
To comprehensively deepen reform, the communique stated that the process involves enhancing the socialist system, building a market economy, promoting development, safeguarding security, strengthening party leadership, and combating corruption amid external risks. Major challenges for Chinese authorities include the property crisis, high youth unemployment, recession, and weak consumer spending, coupled with growing external pressures such as the trade war and sanctions on China. Experts worldwide were hoping for significant structural reforms rather than simply deepening existing ones to help stabilize the economy. They anticipated the Third Plenum would deliver a substantial fiscal stimulus to boost domestic demand, measures to rescue the struggling property sector, or hukou and social security reforms to increase domestic consumption.
To achieve this vision, the document titled "Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Further Deepening Reform Comprehensively to Advance Chinese Modernization" outlines several objectives:
1. Building a high-standard socialist market economy: Establish a socialist system that enhances self-reliance and strength in science and technology, and promotes high-standard opening up.
2. Advancing whole-process people's democracy: Maintain the unity between Party leadership, the running of the country by the people, and law-based governance.
3. Developing a strong socialist culture in China: Promote cultural prosperity, enrich the intellectual and cultural lives of the people, and enhance China's cultural soft power and the appeal of Chinese culture.
4. Improving the people's quality of life: Refine income distribution, employment, and social security systems, make basic public services more balanced and accessible, and facilitate notable progress in promoting people's well-rounded development and common prosperity for all.
5. Building a Beautiful China: Emphasize green energy and green transition.
6. Advancing the Peaceful China Initiative to a higher level:** Strengthen the national security system, create new institutions, mechanisms, and methods for social governance, build a new security architecture, and improve the Party's capacity for leadership and long-term governance.
The communique stated that "Chinese modernization has been advanced continuously through reform and opening up, and it will surely embrace broader horizons through further reform and opening up." To achieve Chinese-style modernization, the Third Plenum emphasized the need for China to pursue "new industrialization," develop the "digital economy," and invest in "new energy." It also highlighted the importance of "deepening SOE [state-owned enterprise] reform," "developing the private economy," and "attracting foreign capital." The resolution reassured private entrepreneurs affected by recent regulatory crackdowns, emphasizing the need to create an environment conducive to the development of non-public sectors and the formulation of a private sector promotion law. It also called for refining financing support policies and systems to help private enterprises access affordable financing, while giving market mechanisms a bigger role within the context of strengthened CCP guidance and control over economic activities.
To build a socialist country and economy, the communique stated that China must better utilize market mechanisms and enhance efforts to promote "high-quality development." This includes prioritizing investment in advanced technologies and fostering growth through technological and scientific innovation. Other policy targets include boosting affordable housing, improving job opportunities for young people, and raising the standard of living for the elderly. Innovation will be driven by further development in education, science and technology, and talent cultivation. Strengthening social safety nets, such as insurance schemes and public provisions for unemployment, healthcare, and retirement, is also crucial to boost consumption in China.
The communique emphasized that Science and Technology (S&T) and Innovation play a crucial role in the Third Plenum, highlighting their importance in transforming China's economy from low-budget manufacturing to high technology and achieving socialist modernization. This focus is vital given the ongoing China-US tech war, which impacts China's growth. S&T is now part of Xi Jinping's "New Quality Productive Forces," a term he introduced last year. The communique identified strategic industries such as "new generation information technology, artificial intelligence, aviation and aerospace, new energy, new materials, high-end equipment, biomedicine, and quantum technology." Xi aims to make China a "science and technology great power" by 2035, with "world-leading S&T capabilities and innovation abilities" that achieve "a high level of self-reliance" and "a holistic leap in our economic power, defense power, and comprehensive national power."
Regarding local government reforms, the document stated that local administrations would gradually retain more of the consumption tax, currently fully transferred to the central government and accounting for almost a tenth of all revenues. In 2023, local governments' fiscal revenues were 54% of the nation's total, while their expenditures were 86%, according to the finance ministry. The Plenum plans to address this imbalance.
The communique also stressed the need to "prevent and resolve risks" from the real estate sector, local government debt, and small and medium-sized financial institutions.
The program promises to prioritize environmental criteria over GDP growth when evaluating local officials for promotion and to make polluter emissions transparent to the public through reporting, a method successfully used in advanced economies.
This edition of the plenary session aimed to ensure a higher share of household disposable income in GDP. Investment-led growth has peaked in China, as the financial system can no longer support the same level of credit expansion seen in the past decade. With this growth source drying up, household consumption growth will become the most critical factor in determining China’s long-term economic trajectory and growth rate. A complete restructuring of the economy, fiscal system, and government-led income redistribution will be necessary to change this pattern. In 2024, household disposable income growth was only 5.4%. Many policies and aspirations in the resolution aim to boost consumption, including a long-standing pledge to raise household income as a share of GDP and promised subsidies for childbearing. The government will consider allowing debtors to declare personal bankruptcy and plans to increase pensions "gradually" and welfare spending "within our means."
Politically, the CCP aims to continue improving and developing a socialist system with Chinese characteristics, intending to deepen and strengthen its rule while maintaining its dominant position in China. The Party emphasizes "Modernizing China’s National Security System and Capacity," describing national security as a "pivotal foundation" for China’s modernization. The Party must ensure that high-quality development and greater security reinforce each other. The plenum confirmed the resignation of former foreign minister Qin Gang and the expulsion of former Defense Minister Li Shangfu. Li Yuchao and Sun Jinming of the People's Liberation Army's Rocket Force were also removed from the Central Committee, with their seats filled by Ding Xiangqun, Yu Lijun, and Yu Jihong, who were alternate members.
In conclusion, the Third Plenum proclaimed Beijing’s five-year economic outlook, outlining the broad direction for economic development and policy reform. However, the reform policies introduced during the third plenum did not meet expectations for significant reforms and policy shifts that would help revive the economy. If Chinese leaders are focusing on long-term policy shifts rather than short-term solutions, it is crucial to execute these policies effectively. Addressing the major challenges China faces as an economic power in the present era while implementing these reforms is vital. The Third Plenum has outlined the broad direction for economic development and policy reform in Beijing’s five-year economic outlook.
Reference:
China’s third plenum: a plan for renewed reform? | CSIS. (n.d.). https://www.csis.org/events/chinas-third-plenum-plan-renewed-reform
Sbusch. (2024, July 31). Key takeaways from China’s Third Plenum 2024. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/key-takeaways-from-chinas-third-plenum-2024/
The Economist. (2024, July 25). China unveils its new economic vision. The Economist. https://www.economist.com/china/2024/07/25/china-unveils-its-new-economic-vision
Yi, F. (2024, July 31). China’s third plenum wants to raise household income. That’s good news for the US. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/07/chinas-third-plenum-wants-to-raise-household-income-thats-good-news-for-the-us/
China's top internet regulator has unveiled a large language model (LLM) rooted in Xi Jinping's political philosophy, which it describes as a “secure and reliable” AI system, according to multiple media reports. Developed by the China Cyberspace Research Institute under the Cyberspace Administration of China, the model incorporates Xi Jinping's political thought along with other government-approved cyberspace themes, as reported by the South China Morning Post. The core content of the LLM includes "Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," which was incorporated into China's constitution in 2018. This philosophy addresses various facets of political, social, and economic life.
The model is based on pre-trained language models approved by the government and is currently in the internal testing phase, available exclusively to "designated users by invitation." This initiative to embed Xi's philosophy in AI technology comes as Chinese officials strive to balance stringent free speech regulations with the advancement of AI development, aiming to compete with platforms like OpenAI's ChatGPT. The model clearly demonstrates the vision and thought process of Xi Jinping to further manipulate the native and as well to enhance its soft power culture in other countries, as identified.
In a recent incident, an AI-altered video has surfaced recently on various social media platforms, showing Chinese President Xi Jinping supposedly delivering a speech in English during a visit to the United States. This video has misled social media users into believing it is authentic. The video, shared on Facebook on November 20, 2023, was intended to mock President Xi, who is not known to speak publicly in English. To counter this narrative, the Chinese came up with a clip.
In the one-minute clip, Xi appears before a blue backdrop, delivering remarks on China-US relations in fluent English. According to AFP factcheck, the speech marks upon mutual respect, peaceful coexistence, and win-win cooperation, with Xi allegedly stating that China does not interfere in US affairs and has no intention of challenging the United States. He purportedly suggests that the US should also refrain from interfering in China's internal affairs.
The video circulated widely on platforms like TikTok, with some users expressing surprise at Xi's English proficiency. However, AFP's investigation revealed that the video was manipulated using artificial intelligence. Xi's original speech, given in Mandarin at a dinner in San Francisco, was found on BBC Chinese's X account, posted on November 16, 2023.
AFP confirmed discrepancies between the AI-generated English translation and the official translation by China's Xinhua News Agency. The AI video inaccurately translated Xi's remarks, and parts of the audio did not align with his mouth movements. For instance, where the AI video mentions "wrong policies, wrong actions, and wrong results," the official translation states "misinformed policy-making, misguided actions, and unwanted results." Additionally, the AI translation incorrectly rendered a Chinese phrase, leading to mistranslations such as "China does not read books from the United States."
This incident follows previous instances of AI-manipulated videos, including one featuring Indonesian President Joko Widodo speaking in Mandarin.
Recently, around February, the Communist Party's Central Committee mandated the compulsory study of Xi Jinping's thoughts for all party members to reinforce the Party’s dominance in cyberspace and promote “positive energy” online. The new large language model (LLM) is part of Beijing's latest efforts to control AI narratives within China. Following the release of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan (AIDP) last year (2023), Xi led a Politburo study session emphasising AI's importance in China’s development and governance goals. Politburo study sessions involve top experts delivering lectures to members, helping to signal priorities to lower officials, forge consensus among leadership, facilitate policy implementation, and build leaders' public images.
In May 2024, Xi delivered a keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the 10th ministerial conference of the China-Arab States Cooperation Forum. He announced that China will establish ten joint laboratories with Arab countries in areas including life and health, artificial intelligence, green and low-carbon development, modern agriculture, and space and information technology. Xi stressed the goal of enhancing AI cooperation to empower the real economy and support a comprehensive global governance system for AI.
It's not surprising to see China striving to surpass the US in the AI sector. According to its strategic plan for 2020, China aimed to lead the global AI race. However, the launch of ChatGPT by the US shifted the momentum. In response, Beijing introduced its own version of ChatGPT, determined to remain competitive and maintain dominance. This effort is driven by Xi's belief that AI can help lift China out of its economic challenges. While censorship requirements might slow AI development and limit the commercialization of domestic models, they won't prevent Beijing from leveraging AI where it finds it advantageous. Internal CCP documents reveal plans to use AI to shape reality and strengthen control within China, employing it for political repression, surveillance, and monitoring dissent. Additionally, the CCP intends to drive advancements in industrial engineering, biotechnology, and other critical fields. China has already achieved some success in these areas. Consequently, being second in the AI race might not be of any concern for China, given its firm focus on achieving its regional objectives.
References:
CGTN. “President Xi Jinping: China and the Arab Side Will Enhance Cooperation on AI.” News.cgtn.com, news.cgtn.com/news/2024-05-30/President-Xi-China-and-Arab-side-will-enhance-cooperation-on-AI-1u1AY9yhcYg/p.html. Accessed 31 July 2024.
Kumar, Abhijeet. “China Launches AI Model Based on Xi Jinping’s Philosophy to Counter ChatGPT.” @Bsindia, Business Standard, 23 May 2024, www.business-standard.com/world-news/china-launches-ai-model-based-on-xi-jinping-s-philosophy-to-counter-chatgpt-124052300993_1.html. Accessed 31 July 2024.
“Xi Jinping Calls for “Healthy Development” of AI (Translation).” New America, www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/digichina/blog/xi-jinping-calls-for-healthy-development-of-ai-translation/.
Tibet Story
Unmasking the Truth: China's Campaign of Disinformation on Tibet
By Tenzing Dhamdul
Research Associate Foundation for Non-violent Alternatives (FNVA)
Through the advancement of technology, the dissemination of information has reached unprecedented levels. The popular phrase "at the tip of one’s fingertips" aptly describes the easy availability of unfiltered information. Many countries, especially hegemons, have used this to spread their own narratives, including the British Empire, Hitler’s Third Reich, the USA, and, more recently, the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
The PRC was established in 1949 after the Communist Party of China (CPC), led by Mao Zedong, won the civil war against the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) led by Chiang Kai-shek. Mao Zedong announced the PRC’s territorial claims, which included Tibet, East Turkestan, and Southern Mongolia, during his famous "The Chinese People Have Stood Up" address on September 21 at the 1st Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference. This showcased a meticulous plan for occupying these independent nations and territories through the tactful usage of information warfare.
In 1950, Beijing among other things used the 10th Panchen Lama’s scripted cry for help to invade Tibet, which includes the three traditional provinces of Amdo, Kham, and U-Tsang. And finally, in 1951, Tibetans signed the 17th Point Agreement with the PRC under duress, leading to its occupation. The day of the signing of this agreement has been declared by the PRC as the day it officially "liberated" Tibet, when in fact it symbolizes the day Tibet was occupied by the PRC. These early actions of the PRC under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) regime, which had established the United Front Work Department to spread its influence and narrative beyond Chinese soil, demonstrates its modus operandi to promote its agenda. When it comes to Tibet, the situation is no different. In this context, I present certain themes and subjects regarding Tibet that the PRC has misrepresented through false narratives.
