Iran’s Soft Power Policy in Georgia Mariam Gabedava and Koba Turmanidze Abstract As the newly sanctions-free Iran attempts to overcome its international isolation and economic damage, intensive engagement with Georgia may be of interest for it. While currently the soft power influences are low, but there is some potential for future development. Religion is one tool Iran can use to increase its standing among Georgia’s Muslim population. Whereas the low religiosity of Kvemo Kartli Azerbaijanis can serve as an obstacle to Iran’s soft power, their weak engagement in Georgia’s political life, low civic participation, and high perceived deprivation can prepare grounds for potential influences from the South. For now, the local population is more interested in social and economic issues of bilateral relations and religious relations are given relatively low weight. However, Iran’s energetic actions towards teaching and reviving religiosity among them and the evident material rewards of association with Iran may eventually help overcome this obstacle. Introduction Relations between Iran and Georgia have been intensifying in the past decade. While overall, the two countries are far from being top partners economically, politically or culturally, Georgian openness to Iran came in stark contrast with other democratic states’ shunning of Iran. In this paper we focus on one particular aspect of the relations: the potential for Iran’s religious links to accumulate and be used in the context of soft power in Georgia. The existing scholarship does not study Iran’s soft power as such, but rather attempts to document Iran’s involvement in Georgia in the context of studying Georgia’s ethnic and religious minorities (Therme 2011). This paper attempts to fill this gap. Georgia has been relatively open to Iran in terms of free movement of people and capital, unlike other Western and Western oriented states. At the same time, Georgia has a sizable Muslim population. These two factors provide diverse ways for interaction and influence and create a solid potential for Iran to use religion to achieve its political and economic aims in the region. While religious links are not seen as strong on the surface - not least because of the pervasive dominance of the Georgian Orthodox Church - the soft power potential is on the rise. We focus on Georgia’s Kvemo Kartli region, which has a sizable ethnic Azerbaijani population, a large part of which is Shiite Muslim1, like Iran. We assume that the potential of 1 Georgian statistics office does not break down observers of Islam into the Shia and Sunni groups, however it is known that the Shia community is concentrated in Kvemo Kartli and is Azeri, but there is also a sizable portion of Sunnis among this same population. There is no independent reliable source for this information either, but the generally held estimate is that Kvemo Kartli Azeris are about 70% Shia and 30% Sunni. Gabedava/Turmanidze 1 Iranian soft power is the greatest here. Whereas the low religiosity of Kvemo Kartli Azerbaijanis can serve as an obstacle to Iran’s soft power, their weak engagement in Georgia’s political life, low civic participation, and high perceived deprivation can prepare grounds for potential influences from the South. The data of our analysis stem from two surveys and in-depth interviews. All of them were conducted under the responsibility of at least one of the authors of this chapter. First, CRRCGeorgia conducted a survey on Georgians’ knowledge of and attitudes towards the European Union in June and July, 2013. The data set has 2,462 respondents, including 522 ethnic Azerbaijanis from the Kvemo Kartli Region. The sampling is representative of adults (18 years and older) living in Georgia, excluding the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Ethnic minority respondents constituted 10% of all respondents, of which 33% were Armenians and 67% - Azerbaijanis. Second, we carried out a small representative survey of Kvemo Kartli Azerbaijanis to investigate the potential of Iran’s soft power in the region in July and August, 2015. The survey’s objective was to assess people’s willingness to engage in economic, cultural, and religious relations with Iran. It also provides the respondents’ assessment of the importance of economic, cultural, and religious ties of the region with countries/unions like the United States, the European Union, Russia, Iran, Turkey, and China. The survey was administered to approximately 300 randomly selected respondents. Third, we conducted eleven in-depth interviews with Muslim community leaders in Marneuli district of Kvemo Kartli in April and May 2015. Given the language barrier, we had to hire two local interviewers, who spoke both Azeri and Georgian, to actually conduct the interviews. On the one hand, this allowed for a greater openness of the interviewees, since these individuals were known and trusted inside the community; however, on the other hand – their lack of official credentials for the interviews, other than giving a standard notice of the research project, its funders and purposes, still gave the interviewees a lot of suspicion. This suspicion was cited by the interviewers as the reason for the many cancelled interviews. In the following we will firstly present the short overview of the existing Georgian-Iranian political relations and, secondly, provide a more detailed look at the main potential target for Iran’s soft power: the ethnic Azerbaijani Shia Muslim population of Georgia’s Kvemo Kartli region. We will look at their language, education, economic, political and religious characteristics and causes for their marginalization. Thirdly, we will examine the instruments currently employed by Iran and analyse their current and potential success. Iran as a political actor in Georgia: insignificant on the surface As Iran attempts to overcome its international isolation and economic damage caused by the decades of sanctions, intensive engagement with Georgia may be of interest for Iran. The geographic proximity, Georgia’s status as the South Caucasus hub for international investment and economic development as well as its economic and political openness and access to European markets make Georgia attractive for Iran. Additionally, unlike European countries, the Georgian government and population seem to be welcoming of ties with Iran. Gabedava/Turmanidze 2 The historically strong relations between Georgia and Iran have been scanty for quite some time. Throughout the centuries, eastern Georgian Kingdoms were under the influence of the Persian Empire, politically and culturally. Persia conquered the Kingdom of Kartli in early 16-th century and appointed members of the royal family, who had converted to Islam, as rulers. Georgian nobility and royalty were also keen aficionados and translators of Persian poetry and literature. That influence was largely terminated with Georgia’s alignment with Russian in the late 18th century. Current Georgian popular opinion, largely derived from the, however only focuses on one aspect - that of subjugation and conquest. Since re-establishing Georgian independence upon the fall of the USSR, nationalism has been clearly on the rise. This nationalism has most often taken the form of asserting the national identity based on the Georgian ethnicity, language and Orthodox Christian religion. History in particular has been viewed as a struggle for survival and preservation of these three elements, in the face of the existential threats posed by the mostly Muslim empires surrounding it. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been shut off and ostracized by the West. Georgia has largely followed this policy since its independence from the USSR – despite always having some minimal trade relations. The sanctions towards Iran and Georgia’s alignment with the West impeded the development of deeper relations in any field. Georgia and Iran established diplomatic relations in 1992, soon after Georgia’s independence. The relations were not very intense until the Rose Revolution in 2003 when the relations warmed up noticeably. Still, the Saakashvili government’s November 2010 decision to scrap visa requirements for Iranian citizens caught everyone by surprise. Georgia became one of the only three countries in Europe (Turkey and Armenia being the other two) to welcome Iranians in this way. While many Europeans and Americans were irked, the move fit well with the Saakashvili government’s ultra-liberal economic approach. Georgia had slashed taxes, licenses, and permits, and significantly eased the registration of businesses, and was now seeking out new investors. Iranians quickly flocked to Tbilisi, the trade turnover went up, as did the number of Iranian-owned businesses registered in Georgia. However, despite the gains, the trade relations between the two countries remained negligible – never even reaching 1% of overall trade figures (Table 1). On July 1, 2013, the new Georgian government, which came to power after first electoral turnover of government since the country’s independence, unilaterally scrapped the visa-free agreement. This was officially linked with stricter border management requirements set by the EU as a precondition for visa-liberalization with Georgia. But visa-free regime was reintroduced by the same government in February 2016, following the lifting of the international sanctions on Iran. The Georgian government’s reported rationale for again shifting its course was to further enhance economic and cultural relations (Civil Georgia 2016). It is still too early to see whether the new developments bear much fruit economically; however, it does appear that the Georgian government wants to capitalize on what sanctionsfree Iran has to offer. While trade and investment opportunities were touted as a major developing trend and media coverage of the Iranian entrepreneurs setting up shop in Tbilisi was abundant, the statistics show the meagre reality. Iran and Georgia are not major trade or investment partners, by any measure. However, given the recent removal of decades-long sanctions on Iran, the mutual Gabedava/Turmanidze 3 trade prospects for Georgia and Iran might have some more realistic grounding and possibility. For now, Georgia’s image as an open, liberal haven seems to be one stable aspect of the relations between Georgia and Iran. The visa-free regime did apparently encourage a greater movement of people, particularly around Iranian holiday seasons. Iranian tourists and visitors in Georgia do enjoy much social freedom and gambling opportunities that are definitely unavailable to them at home. However, there continues to be little effort on the Georgian authorities’ side to promote Georgia as a tourist destination in Iran. Still, it seems that the market catering to the emerging interest sprouted almost overnight, with offices in downtown Tbilisi advertising consultation services in Farsi to facilitate the visits for Iranians. The sustainability of this interest and its reach throughout the huge Iranian population would be a matter of separate evaluation; however, it would seem unlikely without a concerted state effort. The Iranian state is officially theocratic and decidedly anti-Western in its rhetoric. However, despite the explosively emotional outbursts, it is widely seen as a shrewd and pragmatic actor in the international arena. Iran is obviously interested in presence in the Caucasus region. Of the three South Caucasus countries, its relations with Georgia are the least developed because of three reasons. Firstly, the lack of a shared border is one obvious hurdle. Secondly, Georgia’s traditional alignment with the West is another obstacle. Thirdly, Georgia’s dominating Orthodox faith and the general wariness of the Church’s and large sections of the population of Islam and Muslims is a factor. Iran, in particular, is popularly seen as an old imperial subjugator, and this legacy combined with the fear of Islamic fundamentalism would be a major deterrent for the broader Georgian public in welcoming close ties with Iran. The need to avoid antagonizing Russia may be the single most important factor in determining Iran’s policy and involvement with the South Caucasus, and perhaps particularly so with Georgia (Therme 2011). Iran has consistently reaffirmed the importance of the principle of territorial sovereignty and has not recognized the independence of the breakaway Georgian regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, following the 2008 war with Russia. Still, Iran and others recognize that Russia has a disproportionately large potential for influence, and many more tools towards it. Besides, Russia is a strategically important actor in the UN Security Council, of which it is a permanent member. Because of all of the factors above, Iranian engagement with Georgia is likely to be more intensive with the population it can have the most common ground with – ethnic Azeri Shia Muslim minority in Georgia. Georgia’s Ethnic Azeri Minority While the general public may not be particularly eager for intensive cultural relations with Iran, Georgia’s ethnic Azeri minority may be an exception. Georgia has two immediate neighbours which are predominantly Muslim, but secular – Turkey and Azerbaijan. Turkey has become more religious in recent years, under the conservative AK party, while the Azerbaijani government remains staunchly secular. Gabedava/Turmanidze 4 The Georgian Azeris are overwhelmingly Shia Muslims, like the Iranians. While for the 70 years of Soviet rule religion was very much discouraged and persecuted, since the independence religiosity has thrived in Georgia. This has included a revival of Islam. While there is little opportunity for religious education in Georgia, Iran is seen as a resource in this regard, and one that is all too eager to offer its help. While ethnic Azeris retain close relations with Azerbaijan, Azerbaijan is largely secular and is not seen as a major actor in promoting religious teaching or funding of religious groups, despite the rise of religiosity there in recent years. Iran, on the other hand, is eager to support both community organizations as well as students willing to study at its universities. Besides the religious kinship, there are other factors that make Georgia’s ethnic Azeri minority a good target for potential influence. This group is a good illustration for the failings of Georgia’s minority policies. In this situation most outside support is bound to be welcomed. This section looks at Georgia’s ethnic Azeri minority and profiles it in terms of economy, language, education and culture and illustrates the ways their disintegration from the Georgian society creates potential for Iranian soft power success in Kvemo Kartli. Marginalization and its Consequences Georgia’s Azeri minority is significant in numbers and its significance is set to grow further. While there is a general population decline in Georgia, this ethnic group is currently about 6.5% of the population and has a high birth-rate. It is very concentrated close to the border with its kin-state Azerbaijan and is Muslim. Azeri minority has very low level of knowledge of Georgian language, and generally, a low level of integration in the Georgian state and society. All of this makes them suspect for majority of ethnic Georgians, the ultranationalistic Georgian Orthodox Church, and to the state. The Azerbaijani population of Kvemo Kartli mostly lives in rural areas and is engaged in the agricultural sector – 65% reported that their household receives income from the sale of agricultural goods, compared to 26% of the rest of the population (Table 2). According to the measurable criteria, the Azeri population’s socio-economic situation does not differ much from the rest of Georgia: the reported unemployment is the same – around 30%, as well as the reported expenditure – about a half of Azeri and the rest of the population spent up to 400 GEL last month (Tables 3-4). This indicates an overall poverty of the population that is fairly equal among ethnic groups; however, the Azeri citizens perceive their poverty as more acute. 67% of Azeri respondents report that they belong to low economic rung, compared to 51% for the rest of the population (Table 5). This points to relative deprivation, the feeling that they are poor and disadvantaged, which can be born out of their low level of engagement with and information about the rest of the country. The reported religiosity of Azeris is much lower compared to the rest of the population – only 10% attends religious services at least once a month, compared to 36% declared by the rest of the population. Likewise, 68% say that religion is important in their daily lives, compared to 82% reported by the rest of the population (Table 6-7). It is interesting to observe, that when asked to identify their religion, a sizable portion of Kvemo Kartli Azerbaijanis identify themselves as Muslim, without Sunni or Shia labelling (Table 12). This, as well as only 6% of Gabedava/Turmanidze 5 respondents saying that they would be going to a Mosque to pray and socialize in their free time (Table 13), point to a little observance of Islam beyond having it as one nominal facet of their default identity. However, when asked about the role that religion plays in society, a majority of respondents feel that it helps to maintain order in the society, rather than playing any destructive role (Table 14). The majority of Kvemo Kartli Azeris don’t have even a basic knowledge of Georgian language, and only 3% speak Georgian well. Their abilities to speak Russian or English are also much lower compared to the rest of the population (14% report advanced knowledge of Russian and 0.4% advanced knowledge of English. Comparable numbers are 29% and 5% for the rest of the population (Table 8). Georgian has always been the state language in the country; however, during the Soviet times, Russian was the lingua franca for communication between the various ethnic groups who were receiving primary education in their mother tongues. This school infrastructure was maintained after the independence, especially in the regions where the minorities actually form a majority of the population. The quality of teaching at these schools, however, has been consistently reported as low, compared to Georgian-language schools. The Georgian language is formally taught in all minority language schools; however, due to the lack of qualified teachers, the state of national language proficiency is dire, especially in the older population (Transparency International Georgia 2008). The reported declined knowledge of Russian language in the younger population throughout the country, including the minority communities, has further advanced isolation among the ethnic communities. The lack of language skills contributes to an effective withdrawal of the minorities (especially those living in the minority-populated regions, away from the capital) from the Georgian society. For years, high-quality Georgian TV signals were unavailable in these regions and even where the signal was available, an absence of minority-language programming meant that minority-heavy regions were receiving their news and entertainment from their kin-states across the border, or from Russian TV channels (Akerlund 2012). This inevitably leads to the minorities being integrated into the information sphere of foreign states and distanced from the Georgian political and social discourse. The Azeri population is disengaged from Georgian political and policy discourse: they are half as likely to be interested in the country’s domestic policies (27%) than the rest of the country (55%) (Table 9). They don’t consume information from Georgia’s national TV channels, including the public broadcaster, which also has a news program in Azerbaijani: only 2% reported watching this channel daily, compared to 27% for the rest of the population. The Azeris have more paternalistic views of the state compared to the rest of the population. Whereas 89% of Azeris consider the state as their parent, who should take care of its citizens like parents do of their children, only 39% believe the same in the rest of the population (Table 10). This effectively means that they consider themselves less as citizens, but rather as subjects, and are less likely than the rest of the population to voice opposition to the actions or policies of the state. Furthermore, the limited Georgian language skills of the minority youths also limit their prospects for higher education within the Georgian educational system. This limitation was Gabedava/Turmanidze 6 further exacerbated by the introduction of a united national entry examination for higher educational institutions in 2005, universally acclaimed to have eliminated bribery and corruption from the testing and university entry processes (Gabedava 2013). However, it also put the inadequacy of the minorities' educational possibilities into the spotlight. The numbers of students from minority-heavy regions dipped dramatically in the years immediately following the introduction of the testing (Tabatadze and Gorgadze 2013). The requirements were gradually tailored to accommodate the reality, and in 2006 the compulsory exams could be taken in Russian language, and from 2008 on the general skills test has also been available in Azeri and Armenian languages. The government also set up courses to prepare the graduating high school students for the university entry exams. Still, given the very low test registration and university admission numbers, in 2009 a temporary quota system was introduced. This “civic integration” measure, as it is called in the Law on Higher Education, is currently set to expire in the 2018-2019 academic year. Georgian Azeris are much less open and more careful in terms of their attitudes to foreigners compared to the rest of the population: whereas the vast majority of the rest of the population approves of doing business with all neighbouring nations, the Azeris only do so regarding Azeris, Georgians, Russians and Turks. Interestingly, only 39% approves of doing business with Iranians, as opposed to 71% of the rest of the population. They approve of marrying only Azerbaijanis, followed by Turks (48%) and Iranians (27%) (Table 11). Additionally, when asked about the acceptability of marrying representatives of various religious communities, there was practically no difference in the overwhelming acceptability of marriage to Shias and to Sunnis, while there was a marked resistance towards representatives of other religions, and particularly atheists (Table 15). However, the alienation and discrimination are not openly discussed by the Azeri community. While this can be attributed to the desire of not standing out too much (Institute for Strategic Studies 2013), it can also be an indication of withdrawal from the Georgian public sphere. The situation on the ground clearly illustrates a lack of real interest in minority issues in general, including the issues of the Muslim population, and a lack of commitment to their integration. Minority Policy in Georgia Georgia’s policy regarding religious minorities is heavily influenced by the strong political influence of the dominant Georgian Orthodox Church. Nevertheless, the state provides funding for certain religious groups and here too demonstrates its ambivalence towards minorities. The Orthodox Church has been funded since the signing of the Concordat (Constitutional agreement between the church and state) in 2002, as a form of restitution for the damage inflicted by the Soviet regime. For the same reason, since 2014 other “traditional” religious groups have received state funding as well: the Muslim community, the Armenian Church, the Catholic Church, and the Jewish community2. The rationale for the specific In 2015 the Muslim community was given GEL2 200,000 Armenian Church – GEL 600,000, Catholic Church – GEL 400,000, and the Jewish community – GEL 300,000, doubling the amounts allocated in 2014. (Source: Tabula Magazine, 2015.) 2 Gabedava/Turmanidze 7 amounts granted to each group is not given by the state. This non-disclosure, as well as the potential for state’s control of the religious groups have been criticized by local civil society groups (Netgazeti 2015). While the other religious groups have had a traditional organizational hierarchy in Georgia, there have been changes regarding the Muslim governance. Historically there was a Muslim Administration of the Caucasus, with the seat in Baku, which Georgian Muslim leadership was subordinated to since the 1920s. In 2011, however, the Agency of all Muslims of Georgia was founded by ethnic Azeri government officials (Prasad 2012) in order to have a separate, Georgian governance body that is not affiliated with the Baku office, and it is now the official counterpart of the Georgian state in religious affairs, and the body that receives the state funding. The creation of the body, however, has created a rift inside the Muslim community. All experts interviewed consider the step rushed, at least, and not fully thought through. They maintain that even the personnel choices were weak and failed to consider their domestic reputation, contacts, and education, both religious and secular. Further, their contacts and standing in the wider Islamic community were apparently neglected (Gvimradze 2015). It is clear that Kvemo Kartli Muslim community felt sidelined from the creation of the body and its management (Prasad 2012). Not all of Kvemo Kartli religious leaders seem to share the discontent. Some of the local religious leaders we interviewed commended the creation of the Agency for all Muslims of Georgia (Mufti Administration of Georgia) and credited it with funding the Muslim religious education in Georgia. They maintained that while before the Administration’s creation Iranian funding was crucial, now the local Georgian state funding had supplanted it. This sentiment, however, is not shared by the expert community. While all Kvemo Kartli interviewees mentioned the Iranian financial support for Muslim education, there is also a report that of all the Georgian state funding given to the Muslim Administration, 75% is allocated for the Muftis salaries, and the rest of the funds are very strictly budgeted by the State Agency for Religious Affairs (NGO joint submission), not allowing the community to independently decide what needs to cater to with the limited funds. It is important to note that the state funding for the Muslim community is only available for one entity (Resolution #117 of the Government of Georgia) - the Agency of all Muslims of Georgia, and it is responsible for distributing the funding to all Muslim institutions across the country, without Shia and Sunni distinction. Some Muslim leaders consider this as pressure on the community and as a state’s attempt to control it (Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center 2015). The fact that changes of the Sheikhs (leader of the Agency) coincide with a change in government, for them further points to the organization and the position being managed by the state. Besides protesting political intervention, there is a protest on religious grounds, regarding the fact that Shia and Sunni Muslims are required to be under unified administration and are effectively disallowed to exercise their freedom of religion. Currently, this norm is challenged at the Constitutional Court of Georgia, awaiting its decision on admissibility (LEPL Supreme Religious Administration of Georgia’s all Muslims 2016). Whereas currently there is little animosity or even active distinction between the Sunni and Shia Muslims in Georgia, new schisms may soon be opening up. However due to the very limited religious education levels among the Georgian Muslim population, these Gabedava/Turmanidze 8 conflicts may be based on political, rather than purely religious grounds. And this too may be a reason for demanding separate administrations for the two strands (Mikeladze 2016). The fact that the state is encouraging the creation of a single leadership of the Georgian Muslim community can be interpreted as the state’s attempt to easier manage the security threats that the Muslim population may entail and curb foreign liaisons of the local Muslim groups. However, this security-based approach is also viewed as potentially creating more security challenges in the longer run. Excluding the various Muslim groups from the official leadership position may push their activities underground and make controlling or engaging with them more difficult for the state (Prasad 2012). Given the low religiosity of the population, the Georgian Muslim community does not seem to have any clear leadership that has significant grassroots legitimacy. Instead, several experts have underscored that especially with the Kvemo Kartli Azeri population it is the secular local elders and leaders who have influence, rather than any religious figure, national or local (Mikeladze 2016). State funding notwithstanding, human rights groups point to the worsening minority rights situation since the change of government in 2012. The Muslim community has been a particularly easy target, and since 2012 six major incidents of restricting their religious freedom were observed. These incidents all happened in the Adjara region, targeting the local ethnic Georgian Sunni Muslim population; however, the state’s unwillingness to prevent violence and effectively investigate the incidents illustrates the environment of impunity regarding the violation of religious rights (NGO joint submission 2015). This is also a potent signal for Shiite Muslims, among other minorities, that the Orthodox Church’s dominance permeates not only the personal beliefs of Georgian population, but of the civil service as well, and may well be placed above the rule of law in practice. Tools of influence: Islamic education in Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeri Muslims are predominantly Shiite and it seems that the Shiite Iran is an attractive and readily available partner for religious relations. However, religiosity was discouraged during the 70 years of Soviet rule, places of worship were closed, and clergy and believers of all religions were persecuted. Also for the Georgian Muslim community, this strict secularity has meant that a large majority did not practice religion. It is widely believed and mentioned during all interviews, that there is indeed little knowledge of Islam among the Georgian Muslims. The Azeri population of Kvemo Kartli is not particularly religious. However, in the recent years, there seems to be growing interest in religious way of life. Given the Georgian state and society’s little willingness to go beyond the declared “tolerance” of diversity, very little of this interest is facilitated by the state. One of the most important aspects of religious life is religious education. There are limited opportunities to get Islamic education in Georgia. Madrasas that provide basic religious instruction do exist, but they are outside the national education system. The lack of qualified instructors is often mentioned by all parties familiar with the situation as the main reason for the low levels of religious education among the Muslims in Georgia. Currently, no accredited Gabedava/Turmanidze 9 Georgian educational institution offers a course in Islamic studies and despite the interest evident in our interviews with the Muslim community representatives, no change seems to be apparent (Institute for Strategic Studies 2013). Consequently, the only real sources of education are foreign. Iran is cited as being among the countries most active in providing teaching opportunities for Georgian Muslims, along with Azerbaijan and Saudi Arabia. These are not only religious learning opportunities, but also reportedly offer Georgian language and computer courses. While these are officially not tied with the governments, Iranian Embassy in Tbilisi is said to be actively engaged and providing funding in cash, to avoid documentation of ties (Prasad 2012). Several Iranian religious organizations are reported as working in Georgia, particularly intensively in Marneuli. Among them, Alh Al-Bayt was the only one named by our interviewees. It is active in supporting the madrasas and providing them with religious literature, as well as renovating a Shiite Mosque in Marneuli (Prasad 2012). The organization was also reported to be active in Tbilisi, where it provides free classes in Farsi and supports religious teaching. Iranian support for establishing a madrasa in Gardabani was also mentioned (Gvimradze 2015). The Al-Mustafa International University of Qom in Iran has operated a Georgian representation since 2011. It offers a five-year program of theology, which is free, and also provides accommodation for all students, free of charge. The instruction is in Azeri language and Farsi is also taught. Upon completion of the five-year course, the institution offers possibilities for graduate level studies in Qom itself. However, the institution is not accredited by the Georgian education authorities and its diploma is not recognized by the state as a certificate of higher education. Still, with the reported aim of supplying a cadre of people to serve the religious needs of the Muslim community in Georgia, the civilian concerns of diploma recognition may not be seen as crucial. While there was no reference to the Tbilisi outpost on the Qom University web page itself, it does list 5 Georgian educational institutions as partners in educational cooperation, including the Georgian Orthodox Patriarchate-founded St. Andrew’s University. However, there are no observable traces of active cooperation on the web pages of these institutions. Officially the only requirements for an admission to the Tbilisi outpost of Al-Mustafa University are a high school diploma and Muslim faith. According to our interviews, in practice the local religious leaders have to recommend the prospective students. In addition to the Tbilisi outpost of Al-Mustafa University, there are also possibilities to study in Iran itself. According to our interviews, this is possible for both an Islamic education as well as a more civilian education. However, given the theocratic nature of Iran, all those studying in Iran are getting instruction in religion as well. It is not immediately clear, however, how the prospective students are selected. Our interviews in Marneuli indicate that here too local religious leaders facilitate the process. It seems that Iran’s involvement in education is welcomed by locals, although some are noticeably suspicious of the motives. Many of our interviewees alluded to the Iranian policy of spreading and supporting Islamic education throughout the world, which according to them Gabedava/Turmanidze 10 is prescribed for by the Iranian Constitution. Many of the religious interviewees, overwhelmingly Shiite, supported this, noting the scarcity of people in Georgia and Kvemo Kartli who are versed in Islam, and the need to address this. They also overwhelmingly talked about the need for education in “traditional Islam”, as opposed to the teachings of various radical sects, particularly the Wahhabis. The Wahhabis are present in Pankisi Gorge of Georgia, which borders Chechnya, and has both an indigenous Qist3 population, as well as refugees from the Chechen wars. These religious respondents maintained that unlike these fundamentalist groups, who are using religion only as a cover for their violent activities, the followers of traditional Islam were peace-loving and benevolent. They argued that traditional Islamic education promoted good citizenship and was beneficial for the society. According to them, supporting such teaching would leave little space for the wayward sects and ensure both spirituality as well as national security. Those residents of Kvemo Kartli sceptical of Iran’s motivations spoke of calculated interest. They maintained that Iran is seeking to establish good will among the Shiites in Georgia to then use them for promoting its interests in the country. These interviewees spoke of Iranian Embassy officials visiting Marneuli to inquire about the local religious, cultural, and medical needs and offering their support; the opening and funding of cultural centers that are registered as non-governmental organizations offering classes in religion, as well as more practically useful classes like computer skills and Georgian and English languages to lure more students. In general, these sceptics are not in favor of Iranian religious activism and would much prefer if relations were strictly secular, and related to the economy and secular education. It seems that the state is not particularly pleased with the level of Iranian involvement either; however, it does recognize that it must be able to offer alternatives in order to restrict the current situation. At this stage, there are no alternatives for religious education in Georgia, especially for Shia Muslims, because there is a deficit of qualified Islamic theologians. It seems that the state is carefully watching the situation for now, and considers it a matter of long term policy. However, the Georgian state is not currently taking any active steps (Jejelava 2015). Meanwhile, it is clear that foreign educated Muslims are viewed as potentially serving the interests of these countries, both by the state and by the local expert community. The Effects of Iranian Activities – piety vs. practicality Despite the Iranian efforts, the ethnic Azeri public in Kvemo Kartli does not seem to be swayed by them very much. Both the survey of the public opinion and in-depth interviews show that Iran is not currently considered as a model to aspire to. Its products and universities do not have much esteem, nor do Iranians seem to be favoured as business or personal partners. This is a crucial impediment for Iran’s soft power in the region, as the local population attaches far more importance to worldly goods than religiosity. Facing the more pressing needs for employment, education, economic development and social services, the 3 Qists are North Caucasian people, predominantly Sunni Muslim, but also Christian, who speak Georgian language. Gabedava/Turmanidze 11 Georgian Azeris are compelled to be more practical and judicious in their preferences for friendships and alliances. Kvemo Kartli population assess the current state of Georgian-Iranian relations as not very intense and almost all say they would welcome deeper ties, particularly in the economic sphere. In their opinion Georgia should strive to have good relations with all of its neighbouring countries, including Iran, and should try to benefit from Iran’s huge domestic market. The economic relations are perceived to have deteriorated after the re-introduction of a visa requirement for Iranians entering Georgia and Iranian business’ interest in investing in Georgia is seen as stifled since then. Tourism is believed to be an area for potential growth of the relations, among the Kvemo Kartli population. Iran’s isolation and their still relatively easy access to Georgia, coupled with Georgia’s rich tourism resources, should create an abundant profit for Georgia. Community leaders also commented on Iran’s interest in Georgia as a transit route and as a market for its goods and investment. They think that the recent developments between USA and Iran and the prospects of scrapping the sanctions would be beneficial for Georgia as it would now have a freer hand in its relations with Iran and would not be reprimanded by its Western partners. There seems to be an understanding in the Kvemo Kartli Muslim community that Georgia’s careful and non-vigorous actions towards Iran are caused by its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and care not to upset any important relations. However, not all were of a favourable opinion of Iran’s motivations. Several persons alluded to Iran’s wishes of dominating Georgia, as well as Azerbaijan, and acting as Russia’s proxy in this. Despite the openness of community leaders towards Iran, the general population seems to be less than enthusiastic. It turns out that according to the people, Iran’s influence is very low in the region (Tables 16-17). The majority of those surveyed would rather not buy Iranian products and the desirability of Iran as an educational destination is very low (Tables 18-19). This comes in a stark contrast with the apparent good standing and influence of Turkey, as well as, predictably, their kin state Azerbaijan. Among the areas most developed at the moment, religious ties, including pilgrimage and, surprisingly, medical tourism were mentioned by local community leaders. Iran’s medical industry seems to have a good reputation in Kvemo Kartli. Several people mentioned that the medical visits are, at least in part, paid for by the Iranian side, which seeks out poor patients to receive such help. Iranian is not a popular destination for higher education in Kvemo Kartli’s population. It seems that most students going to Iranian universities do so to study religion and all of them return to Georgia upon graduation, mostly to get involved with religious institutions. All interviewees noted, however, the small number of students going to Iran – one or two persons per year were cited. One reason given for this was the non-recognition of Iranian diplomas by the Georgian state4. The sub-par quality of Iranian education was also cited on several 4 It must be noted, however, that all foreign diplomas must go through a legal certification and recognition process in Georgia, and no foreign diploma is automatically recognized. Hence this issue should not be an o sta le for Georgian itizens’ studies in Iran. However, it does seem that this misconception is a result of the general scarcity of information about Georgian state policies, caused by language and other barriers described earlier. Gabedava/Turmanidze 12 occasions. In contrast, nearly all interviewees noted the relatively high number of students going to Turkish universities, graduates of which apparently have much better chances of success in secular activities. The graduates of Iranian universities are generally well respected due to their religious knowledge. Many interviewees mentioned that since most of the Kvemo Kartli population is rather ignorant in religious matters, those who are knowledgeable, are generally respected. In terms of the employability of Iranian-University graduates, again, religious education is more advantageous, apparently guaranteeing employment in religious institutions, and as several sources mentioned, a good income. Given the fact of discrimination and a lack of employment opportunities for Kvemo Kartli Azeris, the religious realm is also seen as the only sphere where they can realize their knowledge and potential (Mikeladze 2016). It seems that our interviewees have underplayed the engagement with Iran on religious education, however, with other sources suggesting the number of those who have received religious education there number several hundred individuals (Prasad 2012). The fact that those educated in Iran return to Georgia and their home communities and continue to engage in religious education activities, further multiplies the effect of the Iranian taught ideas and ideals. It seems that while interest in religion is there, the largest motivation for the Kvemo Kartli Muslims’ interest in Iran is more worldly. Given the very limited opportunities for advancement in Georgia, and the Georgian state’s unwillingness and inability to systematically address their needs, they seem to be taking whatever opportunities are available, irrespective of who they come from. The fact that Iran is considered as a part of the Shiite brethren only makes accepting its help and involvement easier and better justified. The universal reference to and ascribed importance of the economic and investment relations in our interviews in Marneuli supports this further. These things are particularly consequential for employment and economic well-being in the region, and seem to be valued more than the heavenly blessings. Conclusion This overview of the existing Georgian-Iranian relations suggests that currently the soft power influences are low, but there is some potential for future development. There are very limited trade and investment relations, and increasing opportunities are not proactively created by Georgian and Iranian policies. While Georgia can have some clout as the most accessible island of freedom from the controlling state and religious doctrine for some Iranians, the current links are still fragile. Iran, however, has some potential for influence, primarily through the Azeri Shiite population of Kvemo Kartli. Their very limited Georgian language abilities and the consequent low levels of education and engagement in Georgian politics and public sphere make them more receptive to the influence from outside. The Kvemo Kartli Azeris' perception of deprivation and discrimination, although hushed, is very real and contributes to their estrangement from the rest of Georgia. Additionally, their tendency towards obeying the state and viewing it Gabedava/Turmanidze 13 paternalistically can have two effects. On the one hand, they are extremely unlikely to voice their grievances through the Georgian political and social channels. On the other hand, in the situation of the Georgian state’s continued ignorance of them, they can also be easily lured by Iran, which provides them with education, healthcare, and potential for prestige and employment within their community. For now, the local population is more interested in social and economic issues of bilateral relations. Religious relations are given relatively low weight. The main obstacles to Iran’s influence are the current low religiosity of the Azeris and the availability of Turkey as a destination for work and education, made particularly easy by a shared language. However, Iran’s energetic actions towards teaching and reviving religiosity among them and the evident material rewards of association with Iran may eventually help overcome this obstacle. Additionally, the high social prestige of Iranian-trained religious leaders in the community indicates that Iran’s soft power may gain more substance in the future. The expected persistence of Iran and its long-term planning may well turn Iranian soft power from a potential into reality. References Akerlund, Tobias, 2012. National Minorities and the Media Situation in Georgia. ECMI Working Paper #52 available at: http://www.ecmicaucasus.org/upload/publications/working_paper_52_en.pdf (last retrieved 18.05.2016) Al Mustafa University official web page http://en.miu.ac.ir/index.aspx?fkeyid=&siteid=4&pageid=35782 accessed on 11.05.2015 Civil Georgia, 2016. Georgian PM, Iranian President Discuss Cooperation. Civil Georgia 8 Feb, 2016. Available at: http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28968&search= (last retrieved on 18.05.2016) Gabedava, Mariam, 2013. Reforming the University Admission System in Georgia, in Global Corruption Report: Education. available at: http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/global_corruption_report_education (last retrieved - 18.05.2016) Georgian NGO’s Joint Submission to the Universal Periodic Review of Georgia at the UN Human Rights Council, 2015 Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center, 2015. How is the State Trying to Control Muslim Religious Organizations? Interview with the chair of Supreme Religious Administration of Georgia’s all Muslims, Mirtag Assadov. (in Georgian) 26.11.2015. Available at: https://emc.org.ge/2015/11/26/interviu-mirtag-asadovtan/ (last accessed on 25.05.2016) Institute for Strategic Studies, 2013. Political Aspects of Islam in Georgia; Gabedava/Turmanidze 14 Law on Higher Education of Georgia (#688, adopted on 31.12.2004), Article 473, Article 525, Article 902. Netgazeti, 2015, Funding of Religious Confessions, NGO blaming and other issues in the Religion Agency Report (in Georgian) 24.02.2015. Available at: http://www.netgazeti.ge/GE/105/Life/41769/ (last retrieved – 18.05.2016) Prasad, Conor, 2012. Georgia’s Muslim Community: A Self-Fulfilling Prophesy? ECMI Working Paper # 58; Tabula Magazine, 2015. State Doubled the Funding of Four Religious Confessions, (in Georgian) April 3, 2015. Available at: http://www.tabula.ge/ge/story/94759-otx-religiurgaertianebas-saxelmtsifom-dafinanseba-gauormaga (last accessed on 18.05.2016) Tabatadze, Shalva and Natia Gorgadze ,2013. Evaluation of the Effectiveness of the Quota System in Georgia, available at:http://cciir.ge/upload/editor/file/jurnali%20%20bilingvuri%20/politikis%20dokumentebi% 20/geo/axali/PUB1_ENG_.pdf (last retrieved – 18.05.2016) Therme, Clement, 2011. Iranian Foreign Policy Towards the South Caucasus: Between Revolutionary Ideals and Realpolitik; Transparency International Georgia, 2008. Georgia’s Policy Towards its National Minorities Annex 1. List of experts interviewed Gvimradze Giorgi, Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies, 02.03.2015, Tbilisi, Georgia Jejelava Lela, Deputy Head of the State Agency for Religious Affairs, 04.06.2015, Tbilisi, Georgia Mikeladze Tamta, Civil and Political Rights Director, Human Rights Education and Monitoring Center, 27.05.2016, Tbilisi, Georgia Rondeli Alex, President of Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), 20.02.2015, Tbilisi, Georgia Gabedava/Turmanidze 15 Annex 2. Tables Table 1. Georgian – Iranian trade Geo Iran trade USD thousands, % of total in parentheses 2009 2010 2011 2012 29192.8 55079.5 64871.3 100451.4 (0.6%) (1%) (1%) (1.2%) Import 6425.8 14958.1 16209.1 18519.8 (0.6%) (0.9%) (0.7%) (0.8%) Export 2013 2014 129857 122687.6 (1.6%) (1.4%) 46946.2 28198.5 (1.6%) (1%) 2015 92308 (1.2%) 35782.4 (1.6%) Source: Geostat Table 2. Sources of household income (percent) Population of Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeries Money from family members/relative/friends living 8 in Georgia Money from family members/relatives/friends 11 living abroad Sales of agricultural goods 28 Salaries of all HH members/excluding selling 50 agricultural goods Pensions and state support 48 Income from rent of property 3 Income from sales of property 1 Income from bank deposits 0 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org 2 16 65 30 47 3 3 1 Table 3. Primary activity or situation (percent) Population of Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeries I receive a pension and do not work 17 17 I am a student and do not work 4 1 I am a housewife and do not work 13 24 I am unemployed 31 30 I work full or part-time, including seasonal jobs 22 13 I am self-employed, including seasonal jobs 10 14 I am disabled and cannot work 1 1 Other 1 1 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Table 4. Household spending last month (percent) More than 2000 GEL 1301 - 2000 GEL 701 - 1300 GEL 401 - 700 GEL 251 - 400 GEL Gabedava/Turmanidze Population of Georgia 2 4 9 18 19 Kvemo Kartli Azeries 1 1 9 44 22 16 130 - 250 GEL 18 Up to 130 GEL 12 0 GEL 0 DK/RA 18 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org 13 10 0 1 Table 5. Current perceived economic rung (percent) Population of Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeries Lowest 8 6 2 10 14 3 18 27 4 17 20 5 27 14 6 9 5 7 5 2 8 2 0 9 0 0 Highest 0 0 DK/RA 5 11 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Table 6. How often do you attend religious services? (percent) Population of Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeries Once a week or more often 15 2 At least once a month 19 7 Only on special religious holidays 24 31 Less often 31 42 Never 10 17 DK/RA 1 0 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Table 7. How important religion is in your daily life? (percent) Population of Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeries Not important 3 5 Neutral 14 26 Important 81 68 DK/RA 1 1 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Table 8. Respondent's ability in languages (percent) Georgian No basic knowledge Beginner Gabedava/Turmanidze Population of Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeries 4 4 53 26 17 Intermediate Advanced 13 79 18 3 Russian No basic knowledge Beginner Intermediate Advanced 10 20 42 28 21 20 45 14 English No basic knowledge 63 Beginner 16 Intermediate 16 Advanced 5 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org 95 5 0 0 Table 9. Interest towards domestic policy of Georgia (percent) Population of Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeries Not interested 47 71 Interested 53 27 DK/RA 0 2 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Table 10. Government as parent vs government as employee (percent) Population of Georgia Kvemo Kartli Azeries Government is people's parent 42 89 Government is people's employee 48 7 DK/RA 10 4 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Table 11. Attitudes to foreigners (percent) Approve doing business Approve marrying Population of Kvemo Kartli Population of Georgia Azeries Georgia Americans 83 41 35 Russians 86 59 42 Turks 76 78 20 Iranians 69 39 17 Armenians 71 13 25 Azerbaijanis 79 99 24 Georgians 97 91 91 Jews 74 15 24 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Gabedava/Turmanidze Kvemo Kartli Azeries 6 12 48 27 2 98 19 3 18 Table 8. Respondent's ability in Languages (percent) Georgian No basic knowledge Beginner Intermediate Advanced Rest of the population 1 2 13 84 Kvemo Kartli Azeris 53 26 18 3 9 19 42 29 21 20 45 14 Russian No basic knowledge Beginner Intermediate Advanced English No basic knowledge 61 Beginner 17 Intermediate 17 Advanced 5 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org 95 5 0 0 Table 9. Interest towards domestic policy of Georgia (percent) Rest of the population Interested 55 Not interested 45 DK/RA 0 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Kvemo Kartli Azeris 27 71 2 Table 10. Government as parent VS government as employee (percent) Rest of the population Government is people's parent 39 Government is people's 51 employee DK/RA 10 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org Kvemo Kartli Azeris 89 7 4 Table 11. Attitudes to foreigners (percent) Approve doing business Americans Russians Turks Iranians Armenians Azerbaijanis Georgians Gabedava/Turmanidze Population of Georgia 83 86 76 69 71 79 97 Kvemo Kartli Azeries 41 59 78 39 13 99 91 Approve marrying Population of Georgia 35 42 20 17 25 24 91 Kvemo Kartli Azeries 6 12 48 27 2 98 19 19 Jews 74 15 24 Source: Knowledge and attitudes towards the EU - www.caucasusbarometer.org 3 Table 12. Respondent’s religion (percent) Refuse to answer Don't know Islam Shia Islam Sunni Islam 7 0 28 32 32 Source: Gabedava and Turmanidze (2015) Table 13. What do you spend your free time on? (percent) Don't know Hanging out with neighbors / friends on a meeting spot irzha Going to mosque to pray and/or socialize Spend time with my family Doing sports activities Visiting friends / relatives Watching TV Other 1 11 6 41 4 10 22 6 Source: Gabedava and Turmanidze (2015) Table 14. With which of the following statements about religion do you agree most? Refuse to answer Don't know Religion helps maintain stability in a society Religion rather leads to instability Religion’s role in so iety is un ertain 2 21 53 12 12 Source: Gabedava and Turmanidze (2015) Table 15. Acceptability of a family member marrying a representative of religious group (Combined % of "object little" and "not object at all") Armenian Apostolic Church Georgian Orthodox Church Russian Orthodox Church Judaism Shia Muslim Sunni Muslim Atheist Source: Gabedava and Turmanidze (2015) 21 35 36 28 94 93 20 Table 16. What is cultural influence of …. in your region? (combined % of "very high" and "somewhat high") Gabedava/Turmanidze 20 Azerbaijan Armenia Turkey Iran Russia USA China European Union countries Source: Gabedava and Turmanidze (2015) 78 11 61 25 30 27 16 37 Table 17. What is economic influence of …. in your region? (combined % of "very high" and "somewhat high") Azerbaijan Armenia Turkey Iran Russia USA China EU Source: Gabedava and Turmanidze (2015) 73 10 58 20 29 26 19 34 Table 18. Likelihood of buying products made in … (combined % of "very likely" and "somewhat likely") Azerbaijan Armenia Turkey Iran Russia USA China EU Georgia Source: Gabedava and Turmanidze (2015) 88 24 86 44 62 42 19 21 76 Table 19. If you were to send your child to receive higher education in another country, how likely or unlikely will you be to send him/her to study in … (combined % of "very likely" and "somewhat likely") Azerbaijan? Armenia? Turkey? Iran? Russia? USA? China? European Union countries? Source: Gabedava and Turmanidze (2015) Gabedava/Turmanidze 66 3 69 26 47 30 11 39 21