Expanding Freedom and Democracy
Nations in Transit 2024

Kosovo

Transitional or Hybrid Regime
38
100
DEMOCRACY-PERCENTAGE Democracy Percentage 38.10 100
DEMOCRACY-SCORE Democracy Score 3.29 7
Last Year's Democracy Percentage & Status
38 100 Transitional or Hybrid Regime
The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 7 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 1 the lowest. The Democracy Score is an average of ratings for the categories tracked in a given year. The Democracy Percentage, introduced in 2020, is a translation of the Democracy Score to the 0-100 scale, where 0 equals least democratic and 100 equals most democratic. See the methodology.

header1 Author

  • Anonymous

header2 Score changes in 2024

  • No score changes in 2024.

header3 Executive Summary

In 2023, although Kosovo experienced stability in governance, with Prime Minister Albin Kurti’s Lëvizja Vetëvendosje Movement (Self-Determination Movement, LVV) party enjoying a majority in the Assembly and in Kurti’s coalition government, this did not result in significant improvements to the internal functioning of the state or the effective implementation of reforms. This is due to the ongoing tensions in the Serb-majority municipalities in the north, and the events in the European Union (EU)–facilitated dialogue with Serbia. The year began with preexisting tensions from the 2022 mass resignation of Kosovo Serbs from government institutions and the erection of barricades in the northern part of Kosovo at the end of the year. In January 2023, the joint efforts of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Kosovo Force (KFOR) mission, the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), and the Kosovo Police successfully removed the remaining barricades. However, this action did not mark the resolution of the crisis, which peaked in mid-2023.

Following months of intensive negotiations, Kosovo and Serbia successfully concluded an agreement laying out steps to normalize relations in Brussels on February 27.1 Subsequently, the parties reached a consensus on the Implementation Annex in Ohrid, North Macedonia, on March 18. This was widely considered to be a turning point in which the negotiation process would move away from conflict-management mode and closer to a final agreement.

In April, as Kosovo and Serbia were preparing to commence the fulfilment of their obligations outlined in the agreement, Kosovo was preparing for the snap local elections in the four ethnic Serb–majority municipalities of North KosovoI: Leposavić, Zvečan, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovica as Kosovo’s president, Vjosa Osmani announced in December 2022. The early local elections, scheduled for April 23, encountered challenges when the major local Serb party Serb List opted to boycott the process. The Serb List has strong links to the government in Belgrade, which seemed intent in 2023 on holding tight to its parallel institutions in the north of Kosovo. Consequently, the Serb voters boycotted the elections as an act of protest.

The resulting low turnout led to the election of ethnic Albanian mayors, who assumed office amid significant police intervention led by the central government in Kosovo. This triggered an unprecedented violent outbreak in May, during which protesters injured KFOR troops and journalists were attacked. This halted the implementation of the EU-facilitated agreement and regressed the negotiations back to focusing on conflict management. The coordinated EU and U.S. pressure to withdraw the police force and hold new elections faced resistance in Kosovo. Consequently, the EU imposed measures on Kosovo, halting financial assistance and bilateral political cooperation through December 2023. At the same time, international pressure to establish an Association of Serb Municipalities, as Kosovo and Serbia had agreed to do in 2013 and 2015 as part of their dialogue but had never implemented, also intensified.2 In October, Prime Minister Kurti displayed increased flexibility in considering the establishment of such an association. However, debates and opposition arose over the EU’s proposed draft statute for the association. President Osmani, in her end-of-year speech, deemed the draft an acceptable version, and Kurti has accepted the draft statute but on condition that the agreements is signed in Brussels. This condition has been rejected by President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia.

September saw a worrying escalation of violence in the north, when a heavily armed and well-organized group of Serb assailants attacked Kosovo police at a monastery in Banjska, resulting in the death of one Kosovo police officer and three of the assailants. Milan Radojičić, the former deputy head of the Serb List and a close affiliate of Serbian President Vućič’s, claimed responsibility for the attack, and other connections between the assailants and Belgrade authorities have also been reported. Following the attack, the Serbian military built up a large force on Serbia’s border with Kosovo, which triggered a reaction from the White House and requests to withdraw those troops. NATO then opted to increase the number of troops it had stationed in Kosovo, deploying 1,000 additional troops.

The year ended with significant progress, as in December, per a prior agreement between Kosovo and Serbia, a Serbian company received a license from the Kosovo Energy Regulatory Office for energy distribution and billing in the four northern Serb-majority municipalities. Some incremental progress also took place in December to implement the decision of the Serbian government to recognize Kosovo car registration plates, further advancing the Agreement on Freedom of Movement reached in 2011 in the framework of the EU-led dialogue.

Throughout 2023, Kosovo’s civic sector actively worked to exert influence in the policy-making process. Notably, on significant matters such as the EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia, there is limited participation from the civic sector among both Kosovo’s Albanian and Serbian communities. There is room for improvement in terms of the government’s openness toward civil society.3 Civil society remains actively engaged in addressing the concerning rise in femicide and domestic violence. Additionally, collaborative efforts with Ukrainian civil society and media have been established to exchange knowledge on supporting survivors of sexual violence during wartime.

The annual LGBT+ Pride parade in the capital, Pristina, was held in June 2023 without incident for the event’s sixth consecutive year, reflecting the increasing visibility of the LGBT+ community, in part facilitated by civil society organizations (CSOs). Notably, high-level politicians participated in the parade, demonstrating their support for the cause. Regular drag shows, some in collaboration with Serbian activists, contribute to the visibility of the LGBT+ community. In the latest edition of Kosovo’s version of the reality show Big Brother, a transgender woman is competing and has garnered significant support, marking a positive shift in public perception. Despite these advancements, full emancipation has not been achieved. For example, activists remain dissatisfied with the failure of legislators, particularly those belonging to the Vetëvendosje majority, to push forward the civil code regarding marriage equality and other rights issues. Another ongoing debate since 2023 involves access to in vitro fertilization and other fertility procedures for all women, including single women and those in same-sex relationships; a reproductive health bill guaranteeing access to treatments was discussed four times in the Assembly before receiving a first reading in October 2023, and it had not yet been approved as of the end of the year.4

The media sector remains vibrant and diverse in 2023, despite grappling with crises on multiple fronts. Numerous journalists were injured covering events in the northern part of Kosovo during heightened tensions. Between June and October 2023, a total of 74 attacks and threats against journalists were reported, with 30 of these incidents occurring during reporting in the northern part of Kosovo.5 This marks an increase from 2022, during which a total of 33 physical attacks were registered.6 The events in the north have significantly contributed to this sharp rise. Furthermore, heightened fissures between the government and the media were apparent over the course of the year. Particularly noteworthy were the challenges faced by Klan Kosova,7 the main opposition media outlet in Kosovo.8 The suspension of its license raised concerns, suggesting potential government attempts to exert pressure on the media.

In 2023, Kosovo formally initiated and gained approval for a judicial vetting process through the Constitutional Court, marking the commencement of an ambitious reform effort in the judicial sector. However, on October 17, President Osmani rejected the candidate proposed for state prosecutor, resulting in a crucial position being left vacant.9 Accusations of political interference with the judiciary were levelled throughout the year against prominent politicians by the judicial and prosecution councils, civil society, and media activists. These allegations are frequently aimed at Prime Minister Kurti, who has often been vocal in calling out what he says is the judicial system’s capture by the former political elite, and had presented the vetting system as the only way out of the situation. In March, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers (KSC) at The Hague, known as the Special Court, initiated a complex process against former Kosovo president Hasim Thaci and others for alleged involvement in war crimes in and after the 1998–99 Kosovo War.10 Substantial protests have occurred in support of former Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) leaders who have been held in The Hague since 2020 with no clear endpoint to the ongoing process.

The battle against corruption remains a formidable challenge. Although Kosovo is in the process of drafting a new anticorruption strategy, its progression has faced multiple blockades, with Prime Minister Kurti attributing delays to opposition interference. The Kurti government itself confronted a corruption scandal in 2023 involving unaccounted-for state reserves, which is still under investigation. The removal of the head of the Kosovo Police Special Investigations Unit on July 8 also raised concerns, casting doubt on Kosovo’s commitment to combating corruption. Despite campaigning on an anticorruption platform, the Kurti government has demonstrated limited progress on the matter.

  • 1This agreement originated in 2022 as a version of the so-called French-German plan, offering a new basis for negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia.
  • 2Domènech, B. L. (2023, June 14). The Association of Serb majority municipalities: The Crux of tensions in Northern Kosovo. The Association of Serb Majority Municipalities: The crux of tensions. https://www.epc.eu/en/publications/The-Association-of-Serb-Majority-Mun…
  • 3This divide between Serbian and Albanian civil society organizations (CSOs) culminated in November 2023. Kosovo’s civil society was also divided internally by the European Union (EU) Commission’s decision to permit visa-free travel for documents issued by the Serbian coordination centers in Kosovo.
  • 4Bami, X. (2024, February 29). Kosovo activists protest mps blocking assisted fertilization law. Balkan Insight. https://balkaninsight.com/2024/02/29/kosovo-activists-protest-mps-block…
  • 5“63 raste të sulmeve dhe kërcënimeve kundër gazetarëve dhe medieve janë raportuar për 10 muaj në AGK” [63 Cases of attacks and threats against journalists and media were reported for 10 months in AJK], Klan Kosova, November 1, 2023, https://klankosova.tv/63-raste-te-sulmeve-dhe-kercenimeve-kunder-gazeta….
  • 6Blerta Ahmeti, “Kërcënime me vrasje, sulme fizike e pengim në punën e gazetarëve në 74 raste gjatë 2023-ës” [Death threats, physical attacks, and obstruction in the work of journalists in 74 cases during 2023], Betimi për Drejtësi, January 1, 2024, https://betimiperdrejtesi.com/kercenime-me-vrasje-sulme-fizike-e-pengim….
  • 7In June, the Kosovo Business Registration Agency suspended the business license of Klan Kosova, a key private media outlet, posing a perceived threat to media freedom and plurality in Kosovo (see Independent Media).
  • 8The rift between Vetëvendosje and Klan Kosova predates Vetëvendosje’s rise to power. Vetëvendosje has characterized Klan Kosova as a media outlet aligned with the previous political establishment, alleging connections with Serbia and framing it as pro-Serb. The suspension of Klan Kosova’s license, attributed to the outlet listing Kosovo cities as Serbian, intensified the campaign against Klan Kosova. This narrative drew public comparisons to the closure of pro-Russia media outlets in Poland after Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, further shaping public opinion.
  • 9President Osmani justified the decision in a statement laying out numerous accusations, mainly that she had received threats and pressure to install the proposed candidate, and she said she had cancelled the election process for state prosecutor due to numerous irregularities.
  • 10Human Rights Watch, “Kosovo: War Crimes Trial to Begin in The Hague,” March 31, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/news/2023/03/31/kosovo-war-crimes-trial-begin-hague.

header4 At-A-Glance

National governance in Kosovo remains challenging, as the legislative agenda was challenged by an opposition boycott and the withdrawal of the Serb List from the Kosovo institutions. The authority of Kosovo’s central institutions extends to the northern part of the country, but tensions persisted throughout 2023. Kosovo made progress in electoral reform and held well-managed snap elections in the four municipalities in the north, but those elections were met with resistance by the local Serb population. Despite a dynamic and influential civil society, its involvement in policymaking depends on the willingness of ministries to engage. The media faces numerous challenges, ranging from government pressures to serious safety threats while reporting from North Kosovo. The four municipalities in the north have posed particular challenges to local governance, but concerns have been raised across the country regarding municipal budgeting and favoritism towards municipalities led by Vetëvendosje. The Constitutional Court approved the government’s judicial vetting process in 2023, but progress in judicial reforms has been very slow. The fight against corruption in 2023 has been constrained and politicized, with Kosovo showing little real progress in tackling corruption, particularly at high levels despite that being a government priority.

National Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Considers the democratic character of the governmental system; and the independence, effectiveness, and accountability of the legislative and executive branches. 3.003 7.007
  • Despite its majority, Vetëvendosje faced immense challenges pushing the legislative agenda in 2023. Due to the lack of quorum resulting from a parliamentary boycott by the biggest opposition parties, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK),1 the Assembly did not manage to ratify vital international agreements, some related to the implementation of Kosovo’s Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU.2 In addition to the opposition boycott, a lack of consensus among Vetëvendosje members in the Assembly has also impacted the legislative agenda. Disunity within Vetëvendosje over the civil code and the Law on Freedom of Religion has showcased fundamental divisions within the party on these issues.3
  • The weakened opposition has been using the Constitutional Court as its sole avenue to assert power over the decision-making process. During 2023, the opposition parties appealed seven laws to the Constitutional Court to express dissent against the Vetëvendosje-led coalition to use of its simple majority to bypass opposition.4 As of November 2023, five of these laws are still awaiting the Constitutional Court’s opinion.5
  • During 2023, the continued boycott by the Serb List has immensely impacted the work of the Assembly, especially on issues for which a “double majority” is required.6
  • In February 2023, Kosovo and Serbia reached an agreement in Brussels based on the French-German proposal, known as the Agreement on the Path to Normalization.7 Subsequently, in March 2023, the parties engaged in extensive negotiations in Ohrid to establish a timeframe and action plan, with the implementation annex becoming an integral part of both countries’ EU accession processes. 8
  • On April 23, 2023, elections in the four northern municipalities led to the election of four ethnic Albanian mayors who were rejected by the majority of the Serb population (see Electoral Process). The Kosovo government insisted on the mayors being allowed to take office and sent police to take control of municipal buildings in the four municipalities, triggering mass protests that resulted in injuries to 30 KFOR members and attacks on numerous journalists.
  • In June 2023, the EU imposed punitive measures on Kosovo after it failed to take concrete steps to deescalate tensions and organize new election in the north.9
  • Government ministers and Assembly deputies engaged in a physical altercation on the parliament floor in July 2023, amid heightened polarization mainly triggered by events in the dialogue with Serbia and tensions within the Assembly. The fracas included Prime Minister Kurti, who had water thrown on him by a deputy.
  • Generally, Kurti and Osmani share cohesive policy positions, though there was a minor fissure over the government’s intervention in the northern part of Kosovo and the Association of Serb Municipalities.10 When it comes to matters concerning the country’s internal functioning, Osmani’s role in advancing independent initiatives tends to be marginal, despite her position as part of the government.
  • In September 2023, escalating tensions led to a major security incident in northern Kosovo. The Banjska attack resulted in the death of a Kosovo Police officer at the hands of armed attackers.11 Kosovo’s government claimed that the attack was tied to authorities in Belgrade, and labeled the incident a terrorist attack aimed at paving the way for Serbia to annex North Kosovo. Serbia temporarily increased military presence near Kosovo, later reducing its concentration of forces but maintaining a heightened security alert.12 The White House said the Serbian buildup was “unprecedented” and included sophisticated tanks and artillery, and urged Belgrade to withdraw forces from the Kosovo border.13
  • During 2023, unofficial drafts statutes of the Association of Serb Municipalities circulated.14 Both the government and the opposition met separately with the EU to discuss the draft on November 7, 2023, with the country’s deep polarization preventing a joint meeting.15 The leaders of both the LDK and the PDK criticized the Kurti government, claiming that it has accepted a form of association more detrimental to the country’s internal functioning than the versions the opposition parties had endorsed, in 2013 and 2015, respectively. As of the end of 2023, no cross-party meetings have taken place in Kosovo to discuss the draft statute of the association, and the opposition has not shown the political will to respond positively to an invitation extended by President Osmani aimed at reaching a united position on the issue.16 There is still ambiguity as to how Kosovo will implement a statute for the association in 2024.
  • A year after submitting its application to the EU for member candidate status, Kosovo still awaits a decision. The EU Commission’s country report in November 2023 did not recommend candidate status, citing intra-EU political issues related to Kosovo’s status and Kosovo’s approach in the Brussels dialogue with Serbia as the main obstacles.17 Similarly, NATO membership remains a distant objective due to a lack of unanimity among NATO members.18
Electoral Process 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Examines national executive and legislative elections, the electoral framework, the functioning of multiparty systems, and popular participation in the political process. 3.504 7.007
  • Kosovo held no national elections during 2023. Despite the recently held local elections in 2021, Kosovo held snap local elections in the four Serb-majority municipalities in the north—North Mitrovica, Leposavić, Zvečan, and Zubin Potok—on April 23, 2023, as a result of the mass resignation of ethnic Serbs from Kosovo institutions in 2022.1 President Osmani had initially announced the elections for December 18, 2022. However, due to the tense situation on the ground, the elections were postponed until April, the latest that the legal framework in Kosovo allowed.2
  • The resigning Serb officials included members of the Kosovo Police, the mayors of the four northern municipalities, and 10 Assembly members from the Serb List.3 The resigning Assembly members had been replaced by nine new Serb List legislators and one from another Serb party, the Civic Initiative for Freedom, Justice, and Survival (GI SPO), who took their oaths of office in November 2022 but then departed from the Assembly minutes later.4 They made brief returns to the Assembly in April and September 2023 but continued not to actively participate in parliament or contribute to achieving a quorum.5 The Serb List acknowledged that those returns were primarily aimed at retaining the legislators’ mandates, which, according to the constitution, expired after a six-month absence, and avoiding replacement by other candidates on the waiting list.
  • In March, as tensions were mounting on the ground, the Serb List,6 which had won the vast majority of votes cast in all four northern municipalities in the 2021 local elections, decided to boycott the elections planned for April.7 Only one Serb politician ended up running in the elections as an independent, in Zvečan; another prominent Serb candidate for mayor in Leposavić withdrew following the overall election process boycott.8
  • On April 23, elections were conducted in accordance with Kosovo’s legal framework, aiming for a smooth and orderly process. Despite the postponement and an extended candidate registration deadline aimed at increasing participation, elections were held amid a massive boycott.9 Since school buildings, the usual voting locations, are controlled by parallel institutions run by Serbia and its local proxy the Serb List, authorities instead installed containers along the main roads in the north to serve as polling stations, with a total of 19 voting locations established.10
  • The calls from the Serb List and other Serb political parties for voters not to participate in the North Kosovo local elections led to a significant boycott by the Serb community. Only 1,567 out of 45,095 eligible voters, or 3.47 percent, cast their ballots.11 Technically, the process was managed well, and the elections were conducted in accordance with Kosovo law and were managed fairly by the Central Election Commission (CEC).
  • Kosovo made important progress with electoral reform in 2023, as it adopted the long-overdue Law on Financing of Political Parties. This law is expected to tackle one of the most debated issues among Kosovo’s civil society: political parties’ financial transparency. Additionally, the Law on General Elections was amended to address the longstanding recommendations of successive EU Election Observation Missions in Kosovo. The changes address long-standing issues related to the election procedures, including diaspora voting.12 However, it does not make profound changes in the electoral system or address gender discrimination as had been demanded by civil society.13 The CEC needs to implement the new legal framework well in advance of the next general election in 2025. Although the CEC has handled the previous elections competently, the implementation of the new law, and in particular the diaspora-voting provision, will require more financial and human resources to be able to carry out its additional tasks.14
Civil Society 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Assesses the organizational capacity and financial sustainability of the civic sector; the legal and political environment in which it operates; the functioning of trade unions; interest group participation in the policy process; and the threat posed by antidemocratic extremist groups. 4.755 7.007
  • During 2023, civil society organizations have remained vocal by actively participating in policy-making processes and monitoring the work of the government, as well as by organizing protests.1 For example, advocacy by civil society to extend the mandate of the Commission to Recognize and Verify Survivors of Sexual Violence during the Kosovo War—a government body established to allow those survivors to officially register as victims and become eligible for benefits—resulted in the government supporting a draft law in March that proposed a three-year extension of the commission’s mandate.2
  • In August, activists orchestrated a sizable demonstration in Pristina, pressing for institutional accountability regarding the murder of Marigona Osmani and numerous other women victimized by domestic violence. Osmani’s murderer received a life sentence, but there are many other unsolved cases of femicide in Kosovo.3 In December, civil society organizations staged a protest in response to the murder of Liridona Ademaj. This ongoing case has prompted civil society activists to rally outside the court and the Ministry of Justice, advocating not only for justice for Ademaj but also for a more comprehensive approach4 to preventing femicide.5
  • During the second part of 2023, CSOs in Kosovo expressed their concern about future sustainability due to the EU’s decision to suspend funds for pre-accession assistance temporarily until Kosovo fulfils its obligations toward the EU regarding the agreements with Serbia.6
  • In September 2023, Kosovo became a member of the multilateral Open Government Partnership (OGP) initiative.7 Civil society organizations’ proactive role in the membership process has been a determining factor in preparing Kosovo to fulfill the criteria for joining.8 Working with the Forum for Parliamentary Transparency—an advisory body made up of Assembly members and CSO representatives—the Ministry of Local Government Administration has set objectives and measures in accordance with the OGP’s plans and requirements. These included drafting an action plan and laying out the Forum for Transparency’s activities promoting open government.
  • In December 2023, the government adopted the Draft Document on Dealing with Legislation on Prevention of Money Laundering and Combating Terrorist Financing. Although it directly impacts the work of civil society organizations, comments provided by CSOs were rejected by the government without explanation.9 In March 2023, the Council of Europe started the process of assessing the risk of terrorism financing within nonprofit organizations, actively involving the organizations working to create a conducive environment for civil society in Kosovo. This assessment contributes to the overall review of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, to complete the process by the end of December 2023.10
  • In October 2023, a large group of civil society organizations in Kosovo and Serbia published a statement dedicating themselves to actively contributing to the normalization of relations between their two countries, emphasizing adherence to the terms of the normalization roadmap agreed upon in February. This reaction came as a result of the worsening situation on the ground.
  • In November 2023, the European Commission’s proposal for visa liberalization for people holding Serbian passports issued in Kosovo stirred frustration in Kosovo, including in civil society. Twenty Kosovo civil society organizations issued a statement arguing that this move could disrupt the integration of Kosovo Serbs in the Kosovo system. However, in a subsequent statement, 15 others CSOs based in North Kosovo expressed disappointment in those CSOs’ reaction, highlighting internal polarization over this proposal and its impact on the lives of Kosovo Serbs.11
  • Miners at Kosovo mining giant Trepça held a 10-day strike beginning on October 24, demanding prompt payment of salaries, improvements in working conditions, health insurance and the dismissal of the current management. Miners, Vetëvendosje legislators, and the Ministry of Economy November 3 announced that they had reached an agreement to end the strike.12 The miners remained underground during the strike, and dozens sought medical assistance as their health deteriorated due to conditions in the mine.13
  • Kosovo LGBT+ activists successfully organized the country’s seventh Pride Parade in Pristina, which occurred without incident.14 The LGBT+ community’s increased visibility was evident over the course of 2023 as members participated in cultural events and television shows, such as when an openly transgender person competed on the reality show Big Brother VIP Kosova.15 While this might give an appearance of emancipation, stigmas persist in Kosovo society surrounding gender and sexuality, as displayed by the intense debate and backlash surrounding attempts to pass amendments to the civil code legalizing same-sex unions.16
Independent Media 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Examines the current state of press freedom, including libel laws, harassment of journalists, and editorial independence; the operation of a financially viable and independent private press; and the functioning of the public media. 3.253 7.007
  • Despite Kosovo’s diverse media landscape, including television stations, a public TV channel, radio stations, and numerous online media portals, overall freedom of speech and expression is somewhat restricted and, there were concerning incidents and trends in 2023. Many outlets display reluctance to engage in critical coverage of the government. Journalists and media entities encountered a range of other obstacles, from safety concerns in the tense North Kosovo to frequent smear campaigns by the government, attacks from businesses, and recurrent threats on social media.
  • From January to the end of October, the Kosovo Journalists Association (AJK) counted 63 reported physical attacks and threats toward journalists, 30 of which occurred while reporting in northern Kosovo.1 Activists have been vocal in pushing for the creation of a safer environment for journalists reporting on the ground, who currently lack adequate protection.2
  • In June 2023, media lawyer and activist Flutura Kusari faced calls for violence against her online. She was initially singled out by Rron Gjinovci, a strong supporter of the Kosovo government, who made misogynistic remarks against her after she opposed the government's decision to revoke the license of Klan Kosova and being outspoken in criticizing the government's failure to provide protective measures for journalists reporting from the north.3
  • In May, Vetëvendosje legislators voted Luljeta Aliu, a political analyst who openly backed the ruling party and is aligned with its policies, onto the Independent Media Commission (IMC).4 The AJK protested that the selection of a government supporter to Kosovo’s broadcasting regulatory body5 signals the party’s clear intent to exert control over independent media institutions.6 The draft law for the Independent Media Commission, which is meant to harmonize the country’s regulations with the 2018 EU Audiovisual Media Services Directive, is still awaiting approval from the Assembly.7 In December 2023, the government’s approval of the draft law was met with criticism by the media in Kosovo. Prominent media figures protested that it was drafted without prior consultation with the relevant stakeholders, and that the law’s provision requiring IMC licensing of online media outlets is an attempt by the government to control online media that violates standards established by the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).8
  • In June, the Kosovo Business Registration Agency suspended the business license of Klan Kosova, one of the country’s main private media outlets. This action sent a daunting message to the media in Kosovo,9 causing the European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (EPCMF) to warn other media outlets in the country that they might face the same restrictions.10 The AJK said it was a political move by the ruling party and Prime Minister Kurti to close Kosovo’s largest private and opposition media entities.11 In July, the AJK and civil society activists organized a protest against the decision in Pristina, calling it an attempt by the government to control the media.12
  • Also in July, the AJK criticized attacks on the media by Deputy Prime Minister Besnik Bislimi13 and Interior Minister Xhelal Sveçla.14 In particular, the AJK pointed to a smear campaign against journalist Berat Buzhala15 for publishing an audio recording of a conversation involving the head of Vetëvendosje’s parliamentary group, Mimoza Kusari-Lila. In the June 2023 recording, Kusari-Lila could be heard saying that she had spoken to Radojičić, the former Serb List official, who was wanted by the Kosovo government and was under US sanctions for alleged organized crime activities and would go on to lead the Banjska attack in September 2023.16
  • In September, the public broadcaster Radio Television of Kosovo (RTK) faced gender discrimination accusations over its recruitment process, after journalists Ilire Zajmi and Flora Masurica Durmishi and lawyer Mihrije Beiqi—all three of whom had worked at RTK since its founding in 1999 and were women—were not chosen for leadership positions they were applying for despite the fact that they were the top scorers in open competitions.17 A law governing the RTK that had been proposed in 2018 to resolve issues with the public broadcaster’ financing, property holdings, financial reporting and internal structure still has not been adopted.18
  • In December, a Pristina court found three men guilty for assaulting journalist Valon Syla in Pristina in April and sentenced them to two years in prison each, a rare case in which the judicial system tried a case related to an attack on a journalist.19 According to the SafeJournalists Network, there are typically immense delays in addressing such cases in Kosovo.20 The country’s law concerning journalists’ sources has not been brought in line with European standards for protecting sources and whistleblowers.21
  • Despite defamation being decriminalized in 2012, there is a continued use of strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs) by politicians, businesspeople, and corporations. The AJK reported one SLAPP case during 2023, which was deliberately handled slowly and ended in lenient sentences.22
  • During 2023, Kosovo continued to host Ukrainian journalists,23 and the AJK ran a training program for both Ukrainian and Afghan journalists in Kosovo.24
Local Democratic Governance 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Considers the decentralization of power; the responsibilities, election, and capacity of local governmental bodies; and the transparency and accountability of local authorities. 3.504 7.007
  • Throughout 2023, fissures between the government and municipalities were predominantly related to budget planning. Party politics and rivalry often dominated these debates, as Vetëvendosje enjoyed a majority at the central level but only led four municipalities out of 35.
  • In February, the Ministry of Finance amended the Law on Immovable Property Tax to significantly increase the property tax in 2023. This process took place without following the proper procedures and holding prior consultations with municipalities. In response to an appeal from the mayor of the city of Prizren, the Constitutional Court decided in favor of the ministry in November.1
  • In June 2023, €37 million ($39 million) that had originally been allocated to the municipalities but which the government had attempted to divert were returned to the municipalities.2 This ended a fissure between mayors of the municipalities and the government dating to 2022.3
  • During 2023, the four Serb-dominated municipalities in the north—Leposavić, Zvečan, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovica—operated with limited capacities, as local citizens rejected4 the ethnic Albanian mayors that were elected in April and refused to receive services from the municipal governments.5
  • The ethnic Albanian mayor of Leposavić elected in the boycotted April contest, Lulzim Hetemi, lived in the municipal building from late May, when he said he had been surrounded by violent Serb protesters, through the end of 2023, refusing to leave the office. He was under guard by the Kosovo Police, which remains stationed in the northern municipalities despite local protests and international pressure to decrease the number of central government forces there.6
  • In September, the Ministry of Local Government Administration published instructions on how local citizens could remove their mayors using a petition.7 Citizens of the northern municipalities submitted such a petition on December 19 and it was accepted by the CEC, setting the stage for more snap elections in the north.8 However, the central government is dragging the process out for political reasons, without a clear timeframe for completion. Because the elections are tied to the dialogue with Serbia, both parties in the process are attempting to use it as leverage in the negotiations.
  • In August and September 2023, Leposavić, Zvečan, Zubin Potok, and North Mitrovica, led by their Albanian mayors, became members of the Association of Kosovo Municipalities, a local nongovernmental organization (NGO) which serves as an umbrella group for all municipalities in Kosovo and advocates for cross-municipal cooperation. This, however, is not the type of organization the Association of Serb Municipalities aspires to be.
  • Throughout the year the Kosovo government made progress on implementing its Energy Roadmap in the northern municipalities, which was signed in June based on a 2013 agreement with Serbia.9 Following the December signing of a contract between the Kosovo Electricity Distribution Company (KEDS) and Serbia’s energy company, Elektrosever, Elektrosever will be able to bill and supply energy in the north starting in January 2024.10
  • On December 12, the government announced the draft budget for 2024. However, municipalities led by mayors from opposition parties have raised concerns that funds are not allocated fairly, claiming the government favored municipalities led by Vetëvendosje.11
  • As of December 15, the deadline for Serbs to register their cars in Kosovo, around 4,000 Kosovo Serbs have converted their Serbian car registration plates to those issued by Kosovo.12 The car registration plates issued by Serbian parallel institutions in Kosovo have been major point of tensions in the past two years, and the gradual abolition of their use is considered progress in terms of integrating local Serbs into the Kosovo system.
  • On December 17, Serbia held parliamentary elections, but the government of Kosovo did not agree to allow Serbs to vote in those elections in Kosovo.13 Discussions between Petar Petković, the director of Serbia’s Office for Kosovo and Metohija, and Kosovo Serb representatives focused on facilitating the exercise of voting rights for Kosovo Serbs. However, Kosovo prime minister Kurti said that in order to hold Serbian elections in Kosovo’s territory, including the north, Serbia would need to request the negotiation of an interstate agreement.14
Judicial Framework and Independence 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Assesses constitutional and human rights protections, judicial independence, the status of ethnic minority rights, guarantees of equality before the law, treatment of suspects and prisoners, and compliance with judicial decisions. 2.753 7.007
  • Throughout 2023, the judges, prosecutors, and administrative staff that submitted resignations in the northern municipalities in November 2022 have nonetheless kept their jobs, despite not working. The Kosovo Judicial Council and the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council opted to defer decisions on these resignations while awaiting further developments. Both councils also took measures to guarantee the continued processing of cases, particularly pressing ones.1 The Judicial Council has decided that 83 cases assigned to the Basic Court in Mitrovica will be transferred to Basic Courts in other municipalities.2
  • One of the most sensitive court cases, the 2018 murder of Kosovo Serb politician Oliver Ivanović in North Mitrovica, continued in 2023. Prosecutors linked the killing to Radojičić, the notorious criminal, former Serb List official, and Banjska attack leader.3
  • In September, eight Serbs were arrested after the Banjska attack that month, but four have since been released in the absence of evidence. Four cases are still open as the investigation continues.4
  • In September 2023, Dejan Pantic, a Serb former police officer whose arrest in December 2022 triggered tensions in the north, was released after posting bail. He had been under house arrest since late December 2022, which his lawyer said was an unusually long period.5 Prime Minister Kurti reacted to this decision with a strong statement criticizing the prosecutor assigned to this case. In response, the Judicial Council raised concerns about government interference in important court cases.6
  • In February, the Judicial Council protested against a Kosovo government decision in November 2022 to decrease judges’ and prosecutors’ salaries. However, the Administrative Department of the Basic Court in Pristina annulled the decision in October, ruling that the judicial salaries were guaranteed by law.7 Later, in October and November, special Kosovo Police units, predominantly those operating in the northern part of Kosovo, protested for higher salaries and better benefits after the Banjska attack. To date, the dispute with the special units has not been solved, despite intense negotiations between the government and the Kosovo Police.8
  • In March, prominent judicial figures, including Justice Minister Albulena Haxhiu, the Judicial Council, the Prosecutorial Council, the Supreme Court, and acting chief state prosecutor Besim Kelmendi, collectively pledged to undertake justice reforms. That same month, the speaker of the Assembly, Glauk Konjufca, submitted constitutional amendments to the Constitutional Court for review to initiate a judicial vetting process, in close collaboration with the EU and fully based on the opinion of the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission).9 This followed the completion of work by an ad-hoc commission of the Kosovo Assembly on vetting in the justice system; the commission’s work had been complicated by the absence of the Serb representatives boycotting the Assembly. In December, the Constitutional Court10 gave the green light for most of the proposed amendments to the constitution regarding the vetting process.11
  • In April, the Kosovo Specialist Chambers started the trial of former president Thaçi and three codefendants, all former close associates of Thaçi’s in the KLA and later in peacetime politics.12 All have pleaded not guilty to 10 counts related to alleged war crimes committed in Kosovo from January 1998 to December 2000. The trial is still ongoing and is expected to be a lengthy process. Protests during 2023 called for more transparency in this process, as the court is a hybrid one—based on Kosovo law but located in The Hague with an international staff.13
  • In October 2023, Kosovo president Osmani, rejected the appointment of Blerim Isufaj, the current head of Kosovo’s Special Prosecution, as the country’s chief state prosecutor. Following Osmani’s decision, the Prosecution Council responded that it was “highly unfounded and biased” and politically driven.14 The Prosecutorial Council had given Isufaj a score of 98 out of 100, but critics had blasted the nomination process and complained about political interference and a lack of transparency surrounding his selection.15
  • In July 2023, Justice Minister Haxhiu presented a revised draft Law on the Prosecutorial Council aiming to reform the prosecutorial system. This represents the second attempt at reform, following an opinion from the Constitutional Court demanding amendments. The new draft law addresses the court’s findings.
  • In November 2023, amid fissures between the government and the Prosecutorial Council, Haxhiu called out the prosecution for its conduct in the case surrounding the 2016 death of Vetëvendosje activist Astrit Dehari. She denounced the prosecutor for allegedly holding the Dehari case hostage, calling for justice and responsibility.16
Corruption 1.00-7.00 pts0-7 pts
Looks at public perceptions of corruption, the business interests of top policymakers, laws on financial disclosure and conflict of interest, and the efficacy of anticorruption initiatives. 2.252 7.007
  • Corruption continues to remain an issue of serious concern in Kosovo, and according to the EU Country Report for 2023, the government’s results in fighting corruption are limited.1
  • Kosovo has not had a formal anticorruption strategy since 2018. Since Kurti ran on an anticorruption ticket in the 2021 elections, it was considered a priority to form a working group to develop a strategy. The government of Kosovo has been drafting an anticorruption strategy since May 2023, but the process has been halted due to internal divergences within the working group, which resulted in public statements in May where Prime Minister Kurti accused the opposition of blocking progress.2
  • In April 2023, Nagip Krasniqi, the director of the Kosovo Energy Corporation (KEK), was arrested under suspicion of misusing his position, exercising improper influence, and engaging in a conflict of interest. Krasniqi had been appointed as KEK’s director in October 2021 without a competitive hiring process by a temporary board appointed by the government during Kurti’s first term as prime minister.3 Members of Vetëvendosje allege that Krasniqi’s arrest is retaliation against the ruling party by acting chief state prosecutor Isufaj, whose nomination for appointment as the permanent chief state prosecutor was not supported by President Osmani, and who has also had disputes with Kurti and with Konjufca, the Assembly speaker.4
  • In July, the head of the Kosovo Police Special Investigative Unit, Shemsi Haziri, was removed from its position through a verbal notice without detailed justification for the decision. Haziri was known for leading inquiries against Kosovo’s ambassador to Croatia, Martin Berishaj, and against former KEK chief executive Nagip Krasniqi, both linked to Vetëvendosje. This decision to dismiss the head of important corruption investigations was considered a cause for concern, sending a negative signal to the public about Kosovo’s commitment to fighting corruption.5
  • Also in July, the government returned 75 villas owned by businessmen and various public figures that had been seized in the so-called Brezovica case—a major corruption investigation into illegal construction in Kosovo’s Brezovica resort—after the prosecutor, Rasim Maloku, failed to meet a legal deadline.6 This development put to rest a case that the government of Kosovo had claimed to be its most significant action against corruption. Disregard for legal deadline remains one of the biggest obstacles to successfully prosecuting judicial cases in Kosovo.
  • Kurti’s government faced a corruption scandal when it was disclosed in July that wheat and cooking oil procured for the state reserves had never arrived, allegedly costing Kosovo some €600,000 ($639,000).7 In August, two officials from the Ministry of Industry, Entrepreneurship and Trade who have been linked to the case were arrested.8 Subsequently, the Assembly established a parliamentary inquiry committee in September.9 However, Vetëvendosje deputies are abstaining from participating in its sessions, claiming that the issue is already under investigation and the role of this committee is therefore redundant.10
  • In 2023, the large number of unresolved corruption cases at the prosecutor’s office remains a major problem. During the period from January to September, the Special Prosecution only managed to resolve 731 cases of corruption, while in the same period it accepted 1,157.11 The Special Prosecution filed 43 indictments against 75 people in 2023. Of those, only 13 of the accused, or 17.3 percent, are considered high-profile.12

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Country Facts

  • Global Freedom Score

    60 100 partly free